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Abstract
In this thesis, I address two puzzles regarding Japan’s security policy: (1) its minimalist
military posture despite its economic power during the Cold War and (2) the recent shift from
this minimalist security policy to an assertive one marked by a strengthening of its international
security role and military. I argue that although many IR scholars, mainly from the realist camp,
claim that the formation of the original security policy (puzzle 1) and subsequent transformation
(puzzle 2) is driven by the state’s rational response to external conditions in the international
security environment, it can more adequately be explained by the complex dynamics of internal
contestation among “identity groups” with different visions of Japan’s national identity and
interest.
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Introduction
Japan has always been an intriguing case for scholars of International Relations (IR).
Despite its devastating defeat in the Second World War, the country successfully transformed
itself into the world’s second-largest economy. Observing this economic rise, Kenneth Waltz, one
of the founding fathers of neorealist theory, asserted that the economic powerhouse would
necessarily become a great power by acquiring military capabilities, including a nuclear arsenal,
to secure itself and advance its interests in the self-help milieu of the anarchic international
system.1 Contradicting this predicted rational course of action, however, the “economic giant”
remained a “military dwarf” with a relatively small Self-Defense Force and reliance on the
United States for its national security. For Waltz, the country was a “structural anomaly,”2 and
scholars have since attempted to explain Japan’s “irrational” security policy.3 In short, Japan
constitutes a “puzzle” for many IR experts.
More recently, this puzzle has been complicated by Japan’s shift to a more “normal”
security posture with a strengthening of its international security role and military since the end
of the Cold War. Japan has participated in UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) since the early
1990s and in the war on terror at the beginning of the twenty-first century while investing in
advanced weaponry and even moving toward a revision of Article IX of its constitution, the
famous “peace article,” in which the state renounced war forever. For realists, this transformation
from the previous passive security policy to the new, more assertive one embodies a rational
response to the changing post-Cold War security environment. In their accounts, the new
1

Kenneth Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security 18 (1993): 44-79.
Ibid., 66.
3
Kenneth B. Pyle, The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1996);
Peter Kazenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (New York: Cornell
University Press, 1996); Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007); and Thomas Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism (London: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1998).
2
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post-Cold War security challenges, including the Gulf War, the War on Terror, North Korea’s
nuclear and missile crises, and China’s rapid military expansion, have finally led the “anomalous”
nation to embrace increased realism in its foreign policy and to become a muscular, “normal”
nation.4 And yet, a question still remains as to why these policy changes are occurring at this
precise moment in history. There were numerous occasions during the Cold War that might have
triggered such policy changes. Moreover, we also have to account for the specific character of
Japan’s recent transformation, which is not full-blown rearmament including nuclear capabilities
leading the state to become a great military power as realists would expect. The recent shift in
Japan’s security policy remains another, second puzzle for scholars of IR.
In this thesis, I address these two puzzles regarding Japan’s security policy. I argue that
although many IR scholars, mainly from the realist camp, claim that the formation of the original
security policy (puzzle 1) and subsequent transformation (puzzle 2) is driven by the state’s
rational response to external conditions in the international security environment, it can more
adequately be explained by the complex dynamics of internal contestation among “identity
groups” with different visions of Japan’s national identity and interest. This contestation among
competing identity groups, I claim, reached its peak in the aftermath of the Second World War
when Japan was reconstructing its identity and state structure, and has emerged in the aftermath
of the end of the Cold War as the state is exposed to the new security challenges that compel it to
reconsider its existing identity.
These two pivotal moments of identity construction, during which Japan’s existing
identity became no longer sustainable and the urgent need to construct a new identity emerged,
are what I call an “identity crisis.” This crisis has led Japan to replace its long-held existing
4

Christopher W. Hughes, Japan's Re-Emergence as a "Normal" Military Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press
for the International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2004); and id., Japan's Remilitarisation (Oxon, U.K.: Routledge
for International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009).
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identity in favor of a novel one and undergo an “identity shift.” In each of these identity
crises—the first in the aftermath of the World War II, and the second after the end of the Cold
War—there were multiple different identity groups, domestic political camps that have their own
distinct visions of national identity and interest, or what I call “part-identities.” These groups
underwent political contestation in determining the content of the new state identity as a whole,
or what I call a “whole-identity.” Through the contestation, a dominant, or hegemonic, identity
group emerged and incorporated perspectives of other subordinate groups, constructing a
whole-identity that can be best described as a “mosaic” of multiple discourses.
I argue that there were three part-identities—pacifist, mercantilist, and revisionist—at
work during the first identity crisis at the beginning of the postwar period. The outcome of this
contestation was that the mercantilist camp won the prime minister’s office, incorporated the
pacifist principles into its foreign policy, and presented the state as a “merchant nation” and a
“peace nation” under the Yoshida Doctrine, a grand strategy comprising both mercantilism and
pacifism. This doctrine (1) prioritized economic development, (2) minimized the state’s defense
spending and international security role, and (3) led the state to rely on the U.S. for its security.
This doctrine ultimately set Japan on the path to becoming an economic power without
simultaneously becoming a great military power.
However, the new security challenges that emerged after the end of the Cold War
convinced domestic political actors that the existing state identity was no longer sustainable. The
sudden collapse of a financial bubble in 1991 and the subsequent “lost decade” of economic
stagnation also attacked the self-confidence of the merchant nation. The extant mercantilist
identity evolved into a new part-identity, internationalist, and another new part-identity,
normalist, emerged in the place of the revisionist, while the pacifist identity group faded away

3

from the political front. Because of these changes, Japan is currently undergoing a second
identity crisis, in which the normalist camp has emerged as the new hegemonic identity, while
incorporating elements of the internationalist discourse in a subordinate fashion. This new
dynamic of Japan’s security discourse is effectively shifting its whole-identity to one that
characterizes Japan as a “normal nation” with a greater international security role and military
capabilities, and also as a “global civilian power” emphasizing its use of force for humanitarian
noncombat missions to promote world’s peace and security. Because Japan still has no desire to
aggressively pursue its national interest or send its force for combat missions across the globe,
the new security policy and identity are significantly more nuanced than pure militant realism
would anticipate.
In addition to decoding the two puzzles surrounding Japan’s security policy, I will seek
to contribute to the broader IR debate about theoretical paradigms and policy analysis. On the
theory front, I will present the model of state identity construction via the contestation among
competing identity groups as a causal mechanism between changes in the international security
environment (exogenous shocks) and the identity shift (endogenous change). This mechanism
takes the form of a holistic constructivist analytical perspective and offers an avenue through
which systemic and unit-level constructivism can interact. I also demonstrate how the “mosaic”
picture of identity presented by this model complicates the dominant assumption in all paradigms
of IR, namely that state actors are monolithic entities with coherent sets of interests. On the
policy front, I suggest that a deeper understanding of the complexity underlying nation-state
identity could reveal the direction of Japan’s security policy discourse. In other words,
understanding identity not only helps us make sense of past policies but also puts us in a better
position to predict the potential future trajectory of Japanese policymaking.

4

The following chapters discuss these points in greater depth. Chapter Two begins by
reviewing the existing literature on Japanese security policy and identifying the flaws in the
arguments that need to be addressed. It then lays out a theoretical framework for my analysis of
identity construction while explaining how my approach differs from existing ones, and aspects
of state behavior that IR scholars have largely neglected. The framework defines identity in a
way that helps explain more thoroughly how identity construction processes occur both
domestically and internationally, involving contestation among multiple identity groups,
producing identity as a mosaic of multiple discourses, and determining states’ interests and
security policy frameworks.
Chapter Three addresses the two puzzles of Japanese security policy in the following
three sections. The first section decodes the first puzzle—the state’s minimalist security policy
despite its economic might during the Cold War. It analyzes the first identity crisis at the end of
the Second World War and delineates how Japan came to foster a pacifist, mercantilist identity
and aspire to become an economic power rather than a great military power. The next two
sections decipher the second puzzle—the transformation of Japan’s passive security policy after
the Cold War. This second section examines Japan’s second identity crisis in the post-Cold War
era and how this crisis resulted in the recent developments in Japan’s security policy. Specifically,
this section discusses the emergence of the normalist and internationalist identities during 1990s
and political takeover of power by the normalist in the twenty-first century. The last section of
the chapter focuses on the most recent developments in Japan’s identity and security policy after
the 2009 election, in which the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) ended the Liberal Democratic
Party’s half-a-century-long domination (LDP) of Japanese politics. This section illustrates the
continuity of the normalist policy agenda implemented by the previous LDP administrations
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despite the DPJ’s attempts to form a new security policy.
Chapter Four discusses the theoretical implications of this thesis. In this section, I seek
to contribute to the broader IR literature by exploring how my model of identity construction can
intervene in existing theoretical paradigms. Chapter Five suggests the potential trajectory of
Japanese security policy by consulting what I establish in earlier chapters about the state’s
identity and interests. Chapter Six, the concluding part of the thesis, summarizes the argument
and proposes questions and problems for which future research is needed.

6

Theoretical Framework
In this chapter, I lay out the theoretical framework to analyze Japan’s identity
construction and security policy during the two identity crises. In forming this framework, I
begin by consulting Rawi Abdelal et al.’s depictions of the “content” and “contestation” of
identity. Later, I go on to combine this analytical frame with Kai Schulze’s “levels of identity”
which comprise the whole-identity and part-identity of nation-states. Before doing so, I will
briefly review the existing literature and describe why I employ the constructivist methodology
and how my approach is unique.

Literature Review
This section reviews how the existing literature on Japan’s security policy has attempted
to answer two puzzles: Japan’s minimalist military posture despite the state’s economic power
during the Cold War (puzzle 1) and its recent transformation after the Cold War (puzzle 2).
Specifically, I map out the discussion among realists, liberals, and constructivists and ultimately
side with the constructivist approach while simultaneously identifying its limits, which my
theoretical framework attempts to overcome.
There is rich existing literature by IR scholars, including realists, liberals, and
constructivists, that explores Japan’s security policy. For neorealists such as Christopher Layne
and Kenneth Waltz, Japan’s disproportionate military power relative to its renowned economic
growth and strength is an enigma. They expect economic powerhouses like Japan to transform
themselves into great powers by acquiring military capabilities, including a nuclear arsenal, in
order to secure themselves and advance their interests in the self-help milieu of the anarchic
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international system.5 To neorealists, the country is a “structural anomaly.”6
In response to this enigma—the gap between Japan’s economic might and minimalist
military posture, and the first “puzzle” regarding the state’s security policy—a new generation of
realists has offered varyingly persuasive accounts by introducing different tenets of realist
thought. Jennifer Lind, a defensive realist, contends that the conduct of Japan’s passive post-war
security policy is consistent with the strategy of “buck-passing,” a balancing strategy that does as
little of the required balancing as possible by relying on the efforts of others. 7 Eric Heginbotham
and Richard Samuels argue that Japan’s foreign policy is consistent with “mercantilist realism,”
which “recognizes technoeconomic security interests…as central considerations of state policy,”
based on the idea that technology and national wealth are as important as military power in
maintaining the state’s security standing as they increase the state’s political leverage and
independence.8 Postclassical realist Tsuyoshi Kawasaki contends that Japan’s security policy is
“no puzzle for realism,” and explains that states maximize their security without threatening
others with a security dilemma, all the while being highly sensitive to the economic costs of
defense.9 By emphasizing different aspects of the security apparatus, these scholars, with new
–isms in the realist thought, have provided various accounts of Japanese security policy.
Whereas realists are primarily concerned with security issues, liberals like Richard
Rosecrance emphasize economic considerations and argue that Japan’s foreign policy centers on
commercial interests rather than security ones. In his account, the country has been simply
following the logic of economic rationality as a “trading state,” or, in former Prime Minister
5

Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion,” International Security 17 (1993): 5-51; Kenneth Waltz, “Emergent
Structure,” 44-79.
6
Kenneth Waltz, “Emerging Structure,” 66.
7
Jennifer M. Lind, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck?” International Security 29 (2004): 92-121.
8
Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, “Mercantile Realism and Japanese Security Policy,” International
Security 22 (1998): 171-203.
9
Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, “Postclassical Realism and Japanese Security Policy,” The Pacific Review 14 (2001): 221-40.
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Yoshida Shigeru’s own terms, a “merchant nation” (shonin kokka).10 The underlying assumption
is that the free-trade system allows states to transform their positions through economic growth
rather than through military conquest. Rosecrance argues that the post-1945 “‘trading world’ of
international relations offers the possibility of escaping…a vicious cycle [of warfare and
following interludes] and finding new patterns of cooperation among national states.” 11 In this
new world of cooperation, he contends, “[s]tates, as Japan has shown, can do better through a
strategy of economic development based on trade than they are likely to do through military
intervention in the affairs of other nations.”12
Whereas both realists and liberals focus almost exclusively on material factors such as
the distribution of military and economic power when explicating Japan’s security policy,
constructivists like Thomas Berger and Peter Kazenstein employ an ideationalist approach in
which they emphasize the roles of ideas, culture, norms, and identity. Claiming that domestic
and international experiences of states generate societal norms that limit the possible policies the
nation’s leaders can select from, they argue that Japan has fostered norms against war, or what
they call a “culture of antimilitarism,” coming out of military defeat in World War II. 13
Constructivists rely on such ideational factors for their explanation for the nation’s low military
profile and passive security policy (puzzle 1). According to Berger, any attempt by the state “to
significantly expand…[the] Japanese defense establishments and international roles foundered
on the shoals of domestic opposition”14 due to the antimilitarist norms embedded in public
discourse.
10

Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (New York:
Basic Books, 1986).
11
Ibid., ix.
12
Ibid., ix.
13
Peter Kazenstein, Cultural Norms; Thomas Berger, “Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and
Japan,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identities in World Politics, ed. by Peter Kazenstein (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 317-56; and id., Cultures of Antimilitarism.
14
Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism, 6.
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In these attempts to answer the first puzzle of Japan’s security policy—its minimalist
military posture despite its economic might—the ideationalists seem be able to provide a more
satisfying account than the materialists. The materialist scholars such as realists and liberals, on
the one hand, base their analysis on a rational actor, interest-based approach. They regard the
states as unitary, calculating actors who seek to maximize their interests following the logic of
military or economic expediency.15 In doing so, materialists, or rationalists, assume that interests
are “exogenous to social interaction” and, thus, actors (be they individuals or states) enter social
relations with a “pre-existing set of preferences.”16 The material conditions of the international
structure determine a state’s behavior as states are essentially pursing a given set of interests. As
Robert O. Keohane observes, “the link between system structure and actor behavior is forged by
the rationality assumption, which enables the theorist to predict that leaders will respond to the
incentives and constraints imposed by their environments. Taking rationality as a constant
permits one to attribute variations in state behavior to various characteristics of the international
system.”17 Yet by doing so, realists and liberals cannot adequately elucidate the causes for
variances in states’ behavior despite facing similar material conditions.18 Nor can they fully
explain state behavior that appears similar, but is in fact constituted by different meanings than
those posited by rationalist theories of IR. This is why Japan remains a “structural anomaly” to
neorealists as its limited military posture does not support their argument that the anarchic
international structure compels economic powers like Japan to become military powers in order

15

Vivien A. Schmidt, “Taking Ideas and Discourse Seriously: Explaining Change through Discursive
Institutionalism as the Fourth ‘New Institutionalism,’” European Political Science Review 2 (2010): 5.
16
Christian Reus-Smit, “Constructivism,” in Theories in International Relations Third Edition, ed. Scott Burchill et
al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 197.
17
Robert O. Keohane, “Theory of World Politics,” in Neorealism and Its Critics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New
York: Columbia University Press), 167.
18
Bhubhindar Singh, “Japan’s Security Policy: From a Peace State to an International State,” The Pacific Review
21(2008): 305.
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to secure themselves in such a self-help system.19
In response to this criticism, neorealists might still point to the recent shift in the
nation’s security policy during the post-Cold War era—the second “puzzle” regarding the
policy—to justify their claim. In fact, some realists regarded the end of the Cold War as the last
barrier for Japan to fully remilitarize.20 In Japan’s Reluctant Realism, Michael Green argued as
early as 2001 that Japan is “reluctantly” embracing increased realism in its foreign policy. 21 In
short, Japan has finally become a muscular, “normal” nation.22 In this regard, realists do succeed
to some degree in predicting the direction of the policy and thus addressing the second puzzle,
though the recent change in the policy is nowhere near their image of a fully remilitarized Japan
equipped with nuclear capabilities. Furthermore, realist explanations do not illustrate why the
state decided to redirect its course at this precise moment, but not at other occasions during the
Cold War such as during the Korean War and the Vietnam War. At best, the realist prediction is
that “at some point Japan is likely to build a military machine that matches its economic
might,”23 without specifying when exactly “at some point” is. To be fair, the new derivations of
realism do provide plausible reasons why Japan has not developed military capabilities to the
degree that neorealists would anticipate. They do so, however, by tweaking the realist theory to
fit into Japan’s case, sometimes even to the extent of “violating (or modifying) the core
assumptions of existing realist theory.”24 This stretching of theory to fit the empirical data,
however, renders the universal applicability of the theory suspect, at least as it applies to
19

Layne “Unipolar Illusion”; and Waltz “Emerging Structure.”
Layne “Unipolar Illusion”; and Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States
after the Cold War," International Security 18 (1993): 34-77.
21
Michael J. Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power. (New
York: Palgrave, 2001).
22
Christopher W. Hughes, Japan's Re-Emergence.
23
Rajan Menon, "Japan: The Once and Future Superpower," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 53 (1997): 29,
emphasis added.
24
Andrew L. Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2008): 37.
20
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Japanese foreign policy.
While Japanese minimalist military policy poses realists serious questions, Japan’s focus
on economic development seem to be in line with liberalism, which emphasizes that free trade
and economic interdependence promote economic cooperation rather than military conquest.
However, liberals still have difficulty with explaining the origin of Japan’s aversion to militarism,
an important factor that had developed before the causal, structural conditions stressed by
liberalism had an opportunity to have much influence. Furthermore, liberals cannot adequately
explain the depth of Japanese antimilitarism compared to that of other nations in similar
structural conditions. While war is unpopular in the increasingly liberal, democratic world, no
other states possess as intense a sense of antimilitarism as does Japan.25 Rationalists, be they
realists or liberals, therefore do not seem to provide compelling accounts.
Ideationalist scholars such as constructivists, by contrast, contend that understanding
how actors formulate their identities is crucial to explaining their actions, as in Alexander
Wendt’s words, “identities are the basis of interests.”26 Put differently, rather than treating states
as unitary actors with a set of pre-existing interests and disregarding internal factors such as
identities, ideationalists open the black-box of states and argue that both identities and interests
are socially constructed.27 According to these theorists, differently constructed identities lead to
different states’ interests, different understandings of the surrounding environment, and thus
different behaviors. With this logic, interests are not pre-socially determined variables but
25

Berger, “Norms,” 323.
Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International
Organization 46 (1992): 398.
27
The only exception is neoclassical realism, which incorporates both external and internal variables. While treating
external factors such as relative material capabilities as the independent variable, it acknowledges the effects of
these factors on foreign policy are mediated by the intervening variables, that is, internal dynamics such as
decisions-makers’ perceptions about threats and their ability to mobilize resources behind policy initiatives.
Although neoclassical realists open the black-box of states by accounting for the internal factors, they still do not
question the formations of interests or identities. See Gideon Rose, “Neoclasssical Realism and Theories of Foreign
Policy,” World Politics 51 (1998): 144-72.
26
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depend upon socially constructed identities. States act differently even when facing similar
material conditions as a result of their distinct identities and interests. The variations in states’
behavior, including Japan’s “anomalous” minimalist security policy (puzzle 1), are not a puzzle
for constructivists. Moreover, while the materialist camp treats interests as a constant variable
and the distribution of power as an independent variable, constructivists argue that “power only
explains what it explains insofar as it is given meaning by interest.”28 Stripped of the discursive
meaning rendered by socially constructed interest, material factors carry only the significance
that actors give to them.
This is not to deny the strategic instrumentality of mechanisms such as buck-passing
and balancing set forth by materialists as rational means to advance states’ interests, or ends,
under the given external conditions. When employing these concepts, however, we need to
replace such objectively defined rationality and interests assumed by materialists with
“subjective” ones that are socially constructed based on ideational factors.29 Put differently,
states can still employ these strategies, or means, to advance what they perceive as interests, or
ends, according to their own logic and internally rational calculations. In order to account for
which strategies states would choose, therefore, one needs to consider the construction of state
interests by analyzing state identities. My analysis employs a constructivist approach that enables
explanations of state behavior in the materialist and ideational terms that actors within states
employ to construct their state’s identities and interests.30

28

Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 109,
emphasis added.
29
Schmidt, “Taking Ideas,” 7-8.
30
Using realist and liberalist concepts given the condition of identity may not be a novel idea. Yet, existing
constructivist arguments about Japan’s security policy tend to underestimate or not even discuss realist and liberalist
accounts. For instance, Kawasaki argues how the concept of security dilemma is unappreciated by the constructivist
accounts by Berger and Katzenstein, which, Kawasaki claims, “seriously undermine their case.” Kawasaki,
“Postclassical Realism,” 225-6. Being aware of such somewhat biased accounts by constructivists, I attempt to
maintain a balanced stance between materialist and ideationalist, while I still base my analysis on the latter.
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However, the extant constructivist accounts of Japan’s anti-militarist norms seem to
contradict the recent transformations in Japan’s more assertive identity and security policy,
failing to decipher the second “puzzle.” Critics attribute this inadequacy of constructivist
explanations to two misleading assumptions about identity. First, Berger and Katzenstein
overemphasize the stability of Japan’s pacifist identity to the point of making it appear “static.”31
Thus, they assume the continuity of the nation’s security policy. Critics claim that this is why
they have difficulty explaining the recent shift in the identity and security policy of Japan.32
Second, constructivists treat identity “as a property concept, that is, as an intrinsic attribute of a
state.”33 Instead, critics argue that identity is a dynamic, relational concept since identity is
constructed by drawing social boundaries, or differentiating, between oneself and others. 34 As
the social context changes as states interact with one another, they engage in new forms of
differentiation processes that produce new identities. Of course, identity is “relatively stable” 35
and needs to be so to serve as a plausible variable in analyzing states’ behavior. Yet, as other
constructivists insist, “if constructivism is about anything, it is about change.”36 “[W]hat states
do depends on what their identities and interests are, and identities and interests change.”37
Therefore, identity is not a static but fluid entity.
In order to treat identity as both relational and fluid, I employ a holistic constructivist
approach that combines Berger and Katzenstein’s unit-level approach that focuses on the
intrastate identity construction and a systemic approach that concentrates on the interstate

31

Berger, “Norms,” 324.
Linus Hagström, “Identity Politics and Japan’s Foreign Policy,” Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift 108 (2006): 184-5
33
Ibid., 184.
34
Iver B. Nuemann, “Self and Other in International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 2
(1996): 139-174.
35
Wendt, “Anarchy,” 397.
36
Hagström, “Identity Politics,” 185, emphasis added.
37
Cynthia Weber, International Theory: A Critical Introduction Second Edition (New York: Routledge, 2005): 60,
emphasis added.
32
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identity construction. In doing so, I pay particular attention to how the competing domestic views
of Japan’s national identity contest one another in determining the national identity as whole.
This enables me to explain how Japan constructs its identity through its interactions with other
states at the international level and the complex dynamics of the internal contestations among
competing identity groups at the domestic level. I illustrate that changes in the state’s relations to
others can transform the dynamics of the domestic identity discourse, and vice versa, which leads
to a shift in the state’s identity and thus in security policy. I will discuss this identity construction
process in greater depth in the next section.

Theoretical Framework
In this section, I explain the theoretical framework employed in this thesis to analyze the
identity construction and security policy of Japan. This framework proposes a holistic form of
constructivism that treats identity as both relational and fluid. Before building such a framework,
however, the definition of identity as used by IR scholars needs more clarification.
The concept of identity has been increasingly welcomed by IR scholars with the “rise of
constructivism” after the end of the Cold War. However, as the proliferation of identity analysis
has produced multiple conceptualizations and definitions of identity in the field, “the current
state of the field amounts to definitional anarchy of identity.”38 This led critics to condemn the
utility of identity, as it is “too analytically loose,”39 or it “means too much, too little, or
nothing”40 to be a valid variable for the social sciences. This lack of consensus on the definition

38

Rawi Abdelal et al., “Identity as a Variable,” Perspectives on Politics 4 (2006): 695.
Ibid., 695.
40
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of identity creates what Abdelal et al. calls “conceptual issues”—unanswered questions of how to
compare different types of identities and use identity as a variable—and “coordination gaps”—a
lack of consistency in the use of the concept.41 The definitional anarchy of identity also leads to
an incomplete definition of the concept as a result of “the analytical blindness for [identity’s]
multidimensionality and complexity.”42
In order to address these problems surrounding the concept of identity, I attempt to lay
out a clear theoretical framework to treat it as a tangible and complex, multidimensional variable.
I follow Abdelal et al.’s definition of collective identity as “a social category that varies along
two dimensions—content and contestation.” 43 I then enrich this analytical perspective by
consulting Schulze’s concept of identity as a multi-dimensional character which comprises
different “levels of identity”: levels that comprise the whole-identity and part-identity of
nation-states.44

Content of Identity: Constitutive Norms, Relational Comparisons, Social Purposes, and
Cognitive Models
For Abdelal et al., content describes the meaning of collective identity and takes the four
following forms: constitutive norms, relational comparisons, social purposes, and cognitive
models. The first two forms—constitutive norms and relational comparisons—play a crucial role
in constructing identity by enabling actors to perceive and define who they are. Constitutive
norms are “constitutive rules” which define group memberships and therefore enable a group to
41
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distinguish itself from others.45 They determine the roles of an identity by stipulating the
appropriate behavior for a particular identity. Moreover, constitutive norms are “the very actions
that lead others to recognize an actor as having a particular identity” as they “define the
boundaries and distinctive practices of a group.” 46 Following such practices helps group
members determine the social meaning of the group and enable group-recognition.
The concept of relational comparisons tells us that the content of a collective identity is
relational to an extent that it is a product of comparisons and references to other identities. An
identity is “defined by what it is not, i.e., by some other identities.”47 As Michael Barnett
explains, identity represents “the understanding of oneself in relationship to others… [and
therefore] is fundamentally social and relational, defined by the actor’s interaction with and
relationship to others.”48 Put differently as a “self/other lens,”49 a self constructs its identity by
defining what is unique to itself and therefore different from the other. This distinction between
self and other constructed through their interaction defines the idea or definition of self and thus
the identity. As the international system comprises states and other groups as its dominant actors,
a definition of the self in the IR sense is equivalent to a definition of a group, or a membership,
stipulating who is a member of that group and who is not. Therefore, constitutive norms shape
and construct state identity as a membership determinant in relation to other states.
Moreover, the notion of relational comparison implies that the identity construction of
self is influenced by the other. Identities “may be contingent, dependent on the actor’s interaction
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with others”50 and thus can change as interactions and relationships of the self with the other
develop into different forms. This perspective of identity formation is crucial in analyzing a
state’s identity as a fluid entity because it is continuously produced and renewed as a result of the
nation’s constantly evolving foreign relations with other actors in the international arena.
The last two forms—social purposes and cognitive models—depend on the first two
forms. The concept of social purposes “is analytically similar to the common sense notion that
what groups want depends on who they think they are”51 and defines actors’ goals, interests, and
preferences. By “lead[ing] actors to endow practices with group purposes and to interpret the
world through lenses in part by those purposes,” this purposive content of identity establishes
“obligations to engage in practices that make the group’s achievement of a set of goals more
likely.”52 In the context of state actors, this implies that states form foreign policies in pursing
their goals, or interests. Meanwhile, as actors see the world through their identities, they shape
their understanding of the world, creating a cognitive model—“a worldview, or a framework that
allows members of a group to make sense of social, political, and economic conditions.”53
Therefore, states may act differently according to how they perceive their interests and such
conditions based on their identities. This point corresponds to the aforementioned argument
about why I analyze state identity before discussing the state’s security policy in terms of the
material, strategic concepts of realism and liberalism.
To summarize, the content of identity explains that norms define and construct an identity
and assign social meanings and roles, which in turn form interests and cognitive perceptions of
the world. This process happens through social interactions with others, and identity can change,
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or remains fluid, as the interactions develop into different forms.

Level of Identity: Whole-identity and Part-identity
Abdelal et al.’s concept of identity, however, does not address the multi-dimensional
aspect of identity. As the meaning of relational comparison suggests, a self engages in
interactions not only with one other but with multiple others. Therefore, state identity is
“conceived not as a coherent structure but as a multiplicity of discourses, which emerge in
relations with multiple other [states].”54 For instance, by analyzing the construction of European
Union’s postmodern collectivity through its interaction with Central/Eastern Europe, Morocco,
and Turkey, Bahar Rumelili demonstrates the formation of the self involves various modes of
differentiation with multiple others.55 Within such manifold interactions with the others, “[a
state’s] relationship with the same ‘other’ [state] can also involve multiple modes of
differentiation that result in a complex identity construction” comprising “multiplicity of
identities.”56 Against this backdrop, Alexander Bukh, examining Japan’s identity construction
through self/other lens and locating the USSR/Russia as Japan’s “other,” argues that the political
and socio-cultural identities led to different constructions of the Japanese “self” in the bilateral
relation.57 What these statements suggest is that a state can sustain multiple different identities
within itself in relation to other states.
Being cognizant of this multi-dimensional aspect of identity, Schluze employs the
concepts of whole and parts by Harry D. Gould and those of levels of analysis by Nicholas Onuf
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and contends that there are two different levels of national identity: whole-identity and
part-identity.58 Within a national identity as a whole on the highest level, there exist smaller
parts—part-identities—which interact with each other on the same level as well as upward and
downward to form higher level identities. These part-identities are the multiple identities
constructed via a state’s interaction with other states, e.g., pacifist, mercantilist, and revisionist
during the Cold War and internationalist and normalist during the post-Cold War period in
Japanese case.
Moreover, as Schulze argues, the part-identities “on the same level…are not necessarily
exactly the same” 59 but rather have their own contents: constitutive norms, relational
comparisons, social purposes, and cognitive models. This is why each of Japan’s part-identities
has a distinct vision of national identity and interest, e.g., Japan as a “peace nation” by pacifist
and as a “merchant nation” by mercantilist. This is also why state (or any) identity “can never be
reduced to a single element”60 but must be delineated as what I term a “mosaic” of multiple
discourses, not a monolithic entity as assumed in most of IR theories.

Contestation of Identity and Identity Construction
Here, I will attempt to integrate this levels framework into the last concept of identity:
contestation. Contestation “refers to the degree of agreement within a group over the content of
the shared identity,” and therefore “content [of identity] is the outcome of a process of social
contestation within the group.”61 Thus, identity discourse is “the working out of the meaning of
a particular collective identity through the contestation of its members.” And the contestation
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never ceases as the individuals are continuously proposing and shaping the meaning of the group
to which they belong. Thus, identity is always subject to such “endogenous change”62 remaining
fluid as a result of the constant contestation process.
We can utilize this notion of contestation as a descriptor of the degree to which there is
consensus within a group called Japan over the content of the state’s identity as a whole, or
whole-identity. Identity discourse is a process of determining the content of the whole-identity
through the contestation of the members of Japan, specifically the part-identity groups that have
their own distinct contents and whose members comprise the Japanese public, bureaucrats, and
politicians.63 It follows that the established content of the whole-identity determines the state’s
purposes, interests, understanding of the world, and therefore foreign policy.
While this contestation occurs within states, the identity of a state is also formed through
its constant interaction with other states. These two different avenues—intrastate and
interstate—of identity construction are represented in what Christian Rues-Smit calls “unit-level”
and “systemic” constructivism, respectively. 64 In concert with neorealists’ adoption of a
“third-image” perspective, systemic constructivism focuses solely on interactions between
unitary state actors. Ignoring what happens within the domestic political realm, it explains world
politics simply by theorizing how states relate to one another in the external, international
domain. Wendt provides a prime example of this form of constructivism. By drawing a
distinction between the social identities (the status, role, or personality that international society
ascribed to a state) and corporate identities (the internal human, material, ideological or cultural
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factors that make a state what it is), Wendt brackets corporate sources of state identity and only
focuses on how structural contexts, systemic processes, and strategic practices produce and
reproduce different sorts of state identity. 65
Whereas the systemic approach treats identity as a relational entity by focusing on its
construction at the interstate level, unit-level constructivism concentrates on the relationship
between domestic social and legal norms and the identities and interests of states, drawing
attention to the internal, domestic determinants of national policies. Berger’s and Katzenstein’s
works on Japan’s antimilitarist norms use this form of constructivism. Their analyses, however,
cannot adequately account for how Japan’s identity has shifted through its evolving relations
with other states in the post-Cold War era precisely because they ignore the systemic level, which
prevents them from handling identity as a relational concept. Moreover, despite their focus on
the intrastate level, in their accounts “little attention has been devoted to the question of how
contending views of security identity in Japan have structured specific security practices.”66 Due
to this lack of the systemic perspective and attention to the “contestation” among the competing
identity groups, the existing account cannot treat identity as a fluid entity and, thus, capture
Japan’s recent identity shift. This is why Berger and Katzenstein cannot explain the recent
changes in the state’s security policy (puzzle 2).
Given these limits of the existing constructivist literature on Japan’s security policy, my
approach takes a combination of both systemic and unit-level, or what Rues-Smit calls “holistic”
constructivism, which bridges the two realms and “brings the corporate and the social into a
unified analytical perspective that treats the domestic and the international as two faces on a
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single social and political order.”67 This is because both the domestic and international levels
interact with one another in forming state identity. Though the identity is constructed through the
internal contestation among identity groups, the dynamics of the contestation is always subject to
changes in the state’s interactions with other states and position in the international system as the
domestic actors are discussing the vision of the state that would be appropriate in this
international context. If these external, or systemic, conditions transform (e.g., from the Cold
War to the post-Cold War), the existing state identity may become no longer sustainable. A
reverse could happen as well, if the domestic conditions alter (e.g., from economic growth to
downturn) and compel domestic actors to reconsider the state’s relations to other states and
standing in the international community.
Facing such challenges to its identity both internationally and domestically, a nation will
undergo what I call an “identity crisis,” an intense internal contestation process in its search for a
new definition of state identity. The new round of contestation involves changes in the dynamics
of the internal balance of power among the part-identities or identity groups caused by the rises
and falls of the extant groups as well as the emergence of new ones, which leads to a shift in the
state’s whole-identity and thus in security policy.68 As a result, identity is never static but fluid.
Also, it is this contestation process that bridges systemic and unit-level constructivism and serves
67
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as a causal mechanism between the changes in the international security environment (exogenous
shocks) and the identity shift (endogenous change).
While I will address the theoretical implications of such a causal mechanism in greater
depth in chapter four, it should be noted that contestation does not simply result in one victor
part-identity solely determining the content of the whole-identity, as the literal meaning of the
term may imply. Rather, the dynamic of the contestation process is much more complex; some
part-identities are contradicting, complementing, corresponding, or even depending on one
another. There can be compromises among the identity groups in reaching an agreement on the
content of the state identity as a whole. Due to such complex relationships, the dominant, or
hegemonic, identity group (e.g., mercantilist during the Cold War and normalist in the post-Cold
War period) could incorporate other groups (e.g., pacifist during the Cold War and
internationalist in the post-Cold War period) into its own discourse in a subordinate fashion and
construct the whole-identity, which as a result encompasses multiple aspects of each identity
group and remains a “mosaic” of multiple discourses. It is this heterogeneous nature of identity
that complicates but also enriches our assertions about the concept. It also challenges a dominant
(and perhaps misleading) assumption in all paradigms of IR that state actors are monolithic
entities with a coherent set of interests. I will delve into this point more deeply in chapter four.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I reviewed the existing literature on Japan’s security policy and provided
justification for my use of constructivist approach. I then illustrated the theoretical framework
employed in the thesis, specifically content, level, and contestation of identity. Regarding my
analysis of identity construction, there are three points to be emphasized: the construction
24

process (1) occurs both at the international and the domestic levels, (2) involves multiple identity
groups, and (3) produces an identity as a mosaic of multiple discourses. A state forms its identity
through its interactions with other states and its complex dynamics of the internal contestations
of multiple identity groups. Both the international and domestic levels interact with each other in
the sense that changes in the international system can transform the dynamics of the contestation,
and vice versa. The established identity encompasses different discourses of multiple identity
groups. Against this backdrop, the next chapter discusses Japan’s identity construction and
security policy in the postwar era.
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Japan’s Postwar Identity Construction and Security Policy
The Cold War Era: The Rise of Pacifist and Mercantilist Identities
In this section, I describe Japan’s identity construction and security policy during the
Cold War. I argue that the identity crisis took place through a contestation among three identity
groups—pacifist, mercantilist, and revisionist. The mercantilist camp emerged as the hegemonic
identity and incorporated the principles of pacifism into its foreign policy agenda under the
Yoshida Doctrine, defining the content of the state’s whole-identity as a “merchant nation” and a
“pacifist nation.” As a result, Japan had come to eschew its military sword while concentrating
on its economic development, and not to pursue military independence, and instead relying on
the U.S. for its security.

1945-1960: The First Identity Crisis and the Establishment of the Yoshida Doctrine
After defeat in the World War II in 1945, the Japanese state embarked on a challenging
task of nation-building under American occupation (1945-52). This task included not only the
reformation of economy, government, and constitution but also the reconstruction of state
identity. Under U.S. influence, Japan underwent the first “identity crisis” in which there were
three competing identity groups—pacifist, mercantilist, and revisionist—who had different
visions of state identity and interest.69 This internal contestation culminated in the 1960 mass
demonstration over revision of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, in which the revisionists’
vision was utterly shuttered and the mercantilist Yoshida Doctrine emerged as the centerpiece of
Japan’s postwar foreign policy and identity.
This contestation, however, did not take place independently from the external, or
69

The labels of the three subpart-identity groups correspond to Berger’s characterization of Left-idealist (pacifist),
centrist (mercantilist), and Right-idealist (revisionist). For details, see Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism, 55-66.

26

systemic, pressures from other countries and the Cold War power game, in which Japan had no
choice but to side with the West bloc and follow the world order defined and sought by the
Western powers, namely the United States. This was especially the case for Japan, a country that
was defeated in the world war and needed to appropriately position itself in the new international
system to make peace with its former enemies. Therefore, Japan’s state identity was also shaped
by its interaction with other states, especially the United States and its neighboring nations, and
by its position in the Cold War bipolar order.
The new world order awaiting postwar Japan was a Liberal Democratic Order, in which
the Western powers sought to disseminate free trade and democracy. The Bretton Woods
institutions were established to ensure a new international system based on a belief that free trade
would not only promote international prosperity but also international peace. The unprecedented
growth of world trade following the aftermath of the devastating war under U.S. initiative
presented Japan a path to economic power. Also inspired by liberal principles, the United States
embarked on a universal project of promoting democracy to achieve international peace. This
project included a liberal reformation of Japan as the top priority for the American occupation
authorities, which demanded a series of democratization and demilitarization reforms. Among
these reforms, the new Peace Constitution, mainly written by the Occupation force, was one of
the significant outcomes as it contained Article 9 that reads:
1.

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese
people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use
of force as a means of settling international disputes.

2.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces,
as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of
the state will not be recognized.70
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These principles of Article 9 have been a cornerstone of Japan’s domestic pacifist discourse and
identity, constraining options for security policy decision-making.71
In addition to authoring the constitution, U.S. liberal agendas played a role in selecting
the new Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, whose opposition against the militarist establishment
made him palatable for U.S. Occupation as a candidate for the next leader of postwar Japan.72
He served as the head of the state, and concomitantly as foreign minister, for most of the first
decade of the postwar period. This long-time service in office enabled him to shape the domestic
security discourse, the conception of national purpose, and the new identity of postwar Japan.
The very first task facing the new leader was regaining the sovereignty of the defeated
state. The San Francisco Treaty in 1951, which granted Japan peace with former enemies during
the war and acceptance by the international community, marked a pivotal moment for the state to
redefine its standing and identity in the postwar world. In addressing the treaty, Yoshida and his
followers including Hayato Ikeda and Eisaku Sato, who are known as mercantilists (and also as
mainstream conservatives) envisioned Japan as a “merchant nation” (shonin kokka), a country
that focuses on economic prosperity rather than pursuit of military power. Reflecting deeply on
the lessons of defeat in the Second World War, they had come to believe that postwar Japan
could best pursue its national interest by concentrating on building industrial strength so as to
become a powerful trading nation. They were determined that postwar Japan would not seek
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military independence as they believed that their country would be able to address internal
security on its own but would have to depend on the United States for preventing direct invasion
from outside. Therefore, stationing U.S. forces in Japan following the peace treaty was seen as “a
matter of course.”73 Based on this new representation of postwar national identity, Yoshida
concluded the peace treaty, and his followers later implemented mercantilist policies, setting the
state on a path to economic power.74
Meanwhile, this new representation of postwar Japan was based on Yoshida’s masterful
understanding of international relations at the time. He understood that in order to restore the
nation’s reputation and gain acceptance by the international community, Japan needed to
demonstrate to world opinion its commitment to a new, peaceful course. He foresaw that it was
in Japan’s interests to draw itself close to the United States, the new hegemonic power and the
promoter of the peaceful Liberal Democratic order. He was also confident that Japan’s aspiration
to become an economic power with only minimal military power was made possible by the
emerging Bretton Woods System and, more importantly, U.S. commitment to promote Japan’s
economic development and to maintain its military presence in Japan and the region for fighting
against the Communists.
Yoshida was correct. In the late 1940s, a few years before the San Francisco Treaty was
signed, the U.S. government came to see Japan as a center part of its containment doctrine
against the East bloc, as the triumph of the Communists in the Chinese Revolution in 1949 and
the outbreak of the Korean War in the following year put Asia in the crosshairs of U.S. Cold War
strategy. Fearing that Japan could be incorporated into the Soviet orbit in the wake of the
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Communists’ surge in the region, George Kennan, or “the farther of containment,” recommended
that the purpose of U.S. Occupation in Japan fundamentally shift from liberal reform to
economic recovery.75 Concern that economic unrest could give momentum to the Communist
and socialist movements in Japan prompted the Occupation Force to adopt Kennan’s proposal.76
As part of the containment doctrine, there was also a broad consensus among American
policymakers that their country would keep its military presence in Japan.
While these international conditions gave Yoshida a great bargaining leverage in the
negotiation of the peace treaty, he faced two intractable problems. The first was Japan’s
rearmament. In the wake of the emerging tensions between the East and West blocs in Asia, the
United States demanded Japan’s remilitarization. However, Yoshida was already planning to
resist such a demand, believing that rearmament was not desirable for either Japan or the region
as a whole at that moment. Suffering from their agonizing experiences during the devastating
war, the Japanese people were not likely to support such a move to remilitarization. Nor would
Japan be able to bear the burden of rearmament with its fragile postwar economy. Many feared
that economic unrest would potentially cause social mayhem, resulting in a less secure Japan.
Furthermore, the public and many intellectuals at the time were concerned that rearmament
would encourage the return of militarism, which had led their country to enter into the recent
tragic war. This concern was shared among the other neighboring countries in Asia, many of
which experienced invasion by imperial Japan during the war.
The second related problem was how Japan would accommodate U.S. force in its
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territory following the peace treaty and enter into a collective-defense arrangement. In
negotiating a security alliance treaty, the U.S. government insisted that it could not establish such
an arrangement with Japan, since Japan did not have the means to defend itself nor could it help
defend the United States. These roadblocks to creating a bilateral security arrangement, coupled
with the intensification of the Cold War due to the outbreak of the Korean War at the time,
created increasing pressure from the United States on Yoshida to accept Japan’s rearmament.
Moreover, it was not only the pressure from outside but also from inside Japan that
Yoshida confronted. A competing identity group, the pacifists, opposed the signing of the peace
treaty and its accompanying security treaty with the United States. This identity group, consisted
of the Left, including the Communist and Socialist Parties, strongly opposed Japan’s rearmament
and its involvement in the Cold War. In response to the experience of the devastating war and
inspired by the new Peace Constitution, they envisioned Japan as a “peace nation” (heiwa kokka),
a country dedicated to the pacifist ideals of its constitution, and advocated for forthright
unarmament. The pacifists also called for Japan to take a neutral stance in the emerging Cold War,
fearing that the security alliance treaty with the United States would align the state against the
East bloc, invite Soviet hostility, and entrap the country in the Cold War conflicts between the
two superpowers. For the pacifists, it was not appropriate for peaceful postwar Japan to rebuild
its military and enter into the realpolitik of the Cold War power game. “Unarmed neutrality”
(hibuso churitsu) was the correct path for the peace nation.
Despite these pressures from the inside and outside of Japan, Yoshida was able to
skillfully deflect U.S. pressure for Japan’s rearmament and conclude the peace treaty and its
accompanying security agreement by incorporating the pacifist discourse into his mercantilist
foreign policy agenda. He thereby reconciled the coexistence of two different visions of national
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identity—“peace nation” and “merchant nation”—despite their fundamental ideological
difference. Domestically, Yoshida adopted the tone of pacifism in addressing the Diet: “It is my
belief that the very absence of armaments is a guarantee of the security and happiness of our
people, and will gain us the confidence of the world, and will enable us a peaceful nation to take
pride before the world in our national polity.”77 In the negotiation with the U.S. government,
Yoshida argued that Japan had a constitution that, inspired by U.S. liberal ideals and the lessons
of defeat in the devastating war, renounced the possessions and use of arms, and that the
Japanese people were determined to uphold such pacifist principles.78 Yoshida’s firm position
throughout the negotiation led Douglas MacArthur, the head of U.S. Occupation, to accept that
Japan should remain a nonmilitary state and instead contribute to the free world through its
industrial production.79 As a result, Yoshida only made minimal concessions—U.S. bases on
Japanese soil and a limited rearmament—which were sufficient to gain U.S. agreement to a
peace treaty and to a postoccupation guarantee of Japanese security under the bilateral security
arrangement.
While the signing of the peace treaty in 1951 marked a first step in determining Japan’s
standing and identity in the postwar world, the road ahead was not smooth. First, Japan now had
to rebuild its own forces. Upon Yoshida’s agreement to a limited rearmament in the treaty
negotiation, U.S. government disclosed its specific demand in 1952 that Japan would develop a
300,000-man ground force with ten divisions. Prioritizing economic recovery, however, he
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reacted negatively to the proposal. Despite a month of intense negotiation, it was not possible for
the two governments to reach an agreement on Japanese rearmament.
However, the following year saw a shift in the stance of U.S. government as both the
domestic and international environments had changed. Domestically, a recession hit the Japanese
economy due to a drop in procurements related to the Korean War and a tight fiscal policy
implemented at the end of 1953. Internationally, the tension in the region was reduced with the
end of wars in Korean in July 1953 and in Indonesia in July 1954. The conclusion of these
conflicts set a clear geographic demarcation between the East and West blocs, turning the focus
of the Cold War into a long-term development within each bloc. The U.S. government ultimately
came to support Yohida’s position of focusing first on economic reconstruction over or before
rearmament.80
Moreover, when establishing the Self-Defense Force (SDF) in 1954, Yoshida made a
decisive move not to revise the Peace Constitution but to create the forces under the tenets of the
constitution despite the tension between such armed forces and Article 9 that forbids Japan to
have “war potential” (senryoku). In 1952, he ordered the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) to
craft an interpretation of the article that would allow limited rearmament. 81 In 1954, the CLB
declared unconstitutional SDF participation in any collective self-defense arrangements. These
ingenious interpretations not only preserved Article 9 but also allowed Yoshida to use the
constitution as a means to limit Japan’s military buildup, and as a shield to protect against U.S.
80
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demand for rearmament.
Meanwhile, in order to alleviate public anxiety about the return of militarism, Yoshida
established a National Defense Council in conjunction with the creation of the SDF to provide
parliamentary oversight of the armed forces—one of the important instruments of civilian control
over Japan’s military. To further ensure civilian control over the SDF, Yoshida created civilian
defense councilors (sanjikan) to oversee the Internal Bureau (naikyoku) within the Japan Defense
Agency (JDA). In addition, the Upper House passed a resolution forbidding the overseas
dispatch of the new armed forces based on the tenets of Article 9. These antimilitarist
mechanisms served as hadome, or “brakes” in the evolution of Japanese defense policy, which
ultimately worked in favor of Yoshida’s mercantilist agenda.82
While building such constrains on Japan’s military as part of his strategy, Yoshida faced
another obstacle: an emergence of a third competing identity group, the revisionists (also called
the “anti-mainstream conservatives”), led by Ichiro Hatoyama and, later, by Nobusuke Kishi
after the signing of the peace treaty.83 These revisionists welded a muscular notion of national
identity by holding to a traditional vision of Japan as a unique “national polity” (kokutai) marked
primarily by its imperial statute and neo-Confucian values, which emphasize unity and sacrifice
for the national order.84 In line with the realist understanding of the foreign policy, they declared
that for Japan to become a genuine sovereign state, it must repeal Article 9 and rearm as well as
maintain a reciprocal security commitment with the United States.
The increasing opposition from the revisionists, combined with consistent presence of
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the pacifist opponents, severely weakened political support for Yoshida, which led to his
resignation in 1954. As a result, in 1955, Japan saw a reconfiguration of its political party system,
which would be later called the “1955 system” (taisei). In the new environment, the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) emerged as a coalition of the revisionist and mercantilist camps, based
on a platform supporting the capitalist system and the alliance with the United States.85 The
Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) championed the left pacifist position, while the more radical
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) slowly grew stronger on the fringes.
Under the new party system, two revisionists, Hatoyama and Kishi, occupied the prime
minister’s office from 1955 to 1960. With their ideal vision of a muscular Japan, they attempted
to revise the constitution, to carry out a forthright armament, to negotiate a more equal security
treaty with the United States, and generally to pursue a more autonomous independent course. In
seeking an independent diplomacy free of U.S. influence, Hatoyama sought to improve relations
with communist nations so as to maximize Japan’s room for diplomatic maneuvering. In 1956,
Hatoyama succeeded in signing a peace treaty with the Soviet Union. However, the revisionists
faced great obstacles in implementing the rest of their agenda, especially the revision of the
constitution, due to the pacifists’ opposition.86 This turned the revisionists’ attention to revising
the U.S.-Japan security treaty, as they hoped to use the issue to trigger a greater military buildup
and to pave the way for Japan’s participation in a regional collective-security system. Inevitably,
it was believed, such an expanded military role would force the issue of constitutional revision
back on the front burner of the political landscape.
The revisionists’ militant foreign policy agendas, however, not only mobilized the
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pacifist opposition on the left, but also alarmed many mercantilists on the center. These fears
were reinforced as the government prepared to revise the security treaty, with a legislative
proposal to strengthen the powers of the police forces, which was seen by the public as a way to
suppress anticipated anti-revision popular protests. The fact that the new Prime Minister Kishi
was once involved in the policymaking during the world war aggravated the concerns that he
might bring abandoned militarism into peaceful postwar Japan.
Consequently, Prime Minister Kishi’s announcing his intention to revise the security
treaty in 1958 resulted in an unprecedented level of political contestation among the three
competing identity groups—pacifist, mercantilist, and revisionist. Protests spread across Japan
over the next two years, reaching its climax the spring and summer in 1960 (1960 Ampo Toso).
The Socialist and Communist Parties, along with prominent leftist reform intellectuals (kakushin
interii), mobilized the popular protests against revision of the security treaty. With increasing
violence and political tension,87 the Kishi administration came under growing criticism from the
mainstream media, the business community, and even the mercantilist camp within the LDP.
Eventually, Kishi was able to obtain ratification of a revised treaty, but only at the price of his
resignation on June 23, 1960.
On the surface, the battle over the revision issue was a mere political struggle. On the
deeper level, however, it marked a defining moment in determining Japan’s postwar identity, i.e.,
the conclusion of the first “identity crisis.” Kishi’s defeat and the consequent fall of the
revisionist camp paved the way for the successive mercantilist administrations and consolidation
of Japan’s national identity as a “peace nation” and a “merchant nation,” marked by a minimalist
approach to defense and national security, and by the prioritization of economic prosperity over
87
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rearmament. This grand strategy would later be referred as the Yoshida Doctrine, which was
further implemented by his followers who repeatedly occupied the prime minister’s office for
most of the Cold War period. This doctrine was defined by its three fundamental tenets:
1.

Japan’s economic rehabilitation must be the prime national goal. Political-economic
rehabilitation with the United States was necessary for this purpose.

2.

Japan should remain lightly armed and avoid involvement in international
political-strategic issues. The Self-Defense Forces would not be deployed abroad.
Japan would not participate in collective defense arrangements. Not only would this
low military posture free the energies of its people for productive industrial
development, it would prevent divisive domestic political struggles.

3.

To gain a long-term guarantee of its own security, Japan would provide bases for
the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force.88

The pragmatic policies of the Yoshida Doctrine indeed brought some criticisms of the identity
account of the doctrine in later years. Some scholars argue that Yoshida did not use identity
language such as “peace nation” and “merchant nation” in actual identity terms, as he and his
followers “focused on national interest rather than national identity.”89 It is undeniable that
Yoshida and his followers saw a political value in the rhetoric of a “peace nation” and Article 9
for deflecting U.S. pressure against Japan to expand its security responsibilities during the Cold
War, and for unifying the opposing domestic political parties. In fact, Yoshida admitted that “The
day [for rearmament] will naturally come when our livelihood recovers. It may sound devious
(zurui), but let the Americans handle [our security] until then. It is indeed our Heaven-bestowed
good fortune that the Constitution bans arms. If the Americans complain, the Constitution gives
us a perfect justification. Politicians who want to amend it are fools.”90 However, this argument
does not necessarily deny the importance of the identity variable. Even though the intention was
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more of a commercial rather than purely pacifist one, the Yoshida Doctrine based on pacifist and
mercantilist principles, as discussed in the following sections, later served as a standard of what
the nation should do, or even what it is (i.e. identity). In fact, contrary to Yoshida’s prediction,
Japan did not “naturally” rearm even when it transformed itself into an economic power in the
following decades. As Kenneth Pyle observes, the doctrine “took on a life of its own”91 and
served as the central constitutive element of Japan’s postwar grand strategy and identity.

The 1960s and 1970s: The Institutionalization of the Yoshida Doctrine
The nascent Yoshida Doctrine made at the beginning of the Cold War determined
Japan’s foreign policy course for the next forty years. Over the next several decades, Yoshida’s
successors significantly expanded his policies until they became a full-blown national strategy.
Specifically, under the next two prime ministers, Hayato Ikeda (1960-64) and Eisaku Sato
(1964-72), both students of the so-called Yoshida School, the doctrine was institutionalized and
consolidated into a national consensus.
Meanwhile, the 1960 demonstrations that cost the revisionist political prominence
taught these mercantilist leaders to avoid such divisive issues of military buildup and
constitutional revision. They instead adopted a political strategy of a low posture toward the
pacifists with a goal of establishing political stability and policies of managed economic growth.
The mercantilist camp accommodated the revisionists on the right by maintaining a stable
alliance with the United States, while appeasing the pacifists on the left by limiting rearmament
and concentrating on economic growth policies that would improve living standards. 92 Thus,
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political compromise among the three competing identity groups that paved a path for the
Yoshida Doctrine and a national consensus that Japan would be a “non-nuclear, lightly armed,
economic superpower,”93 i.e., the state’s new identity as a “peace nation” and a “merchant
nation” was consolidated.
In forging a path for an economic superpower Japan, Prime Minister Ikeda played a
significant role, especially through his articulation of economic policies under his plan for
doubling the national income within a decade. This plan capitalized on the emerging national
consensus on the priority of economic growth. Due to the 1960 Ampo Toso, the revisionist chant
for constitutional revision, rearmament, and independent foreign policy from U.S. influence had
lost its political appeal for the Japanese public. They also rejected the pacifist demand for Japan’s
“unarmed neutrality” wrapped in its pro-Soviet and pro-China socialist narrative, as the living
standard improved under the new economic policies and the real picture of the oppressive regime
in the Communist bloc increasingly became more widely known. Consequently, the Japanese
public came to prefer the limited defense posture under the Peace Constitution. The national
consensus was that “the general priority…[should be given to] first and foremost economic
growth, with Japan neither adopting unarmed neutrality and socialism nor returning to the dark
days of the prewar by adopting large-scale rearmament through a divisive constitutional revision
process.”94
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Ikeda’s mercantilist agenda captured this emerging national sentiment, consequently
co-opting the pacifist discourse of antimilitarism and ultimately settling Japan to a long period of
enthusiastic pursuit of high-growth policies over rearmament. And in fact, Ikeda’s economic
policies witnessed success that was more impressive than expected. While he targeted annual
growth of 7.2 percent to achieve a doubling of national income in a decade, Japan saw a
surprising annual growth rate of 10.9 percent during the 1960s. Ikeda not only captured the
economic-centered sentiment among the Japanese public, but also was also able to transform the
national consensus into actual economic growth, setting a clear path for Japan as an economic
superpower and reinforcing the continuity of the Yoshida Doctrine.95
Building upon Ikeda’s success, another Yoshida protégé, Eisaku Sato, held the prime
minister’s seat longer (1964-72) than any other individual in Japanese history and further
institutionalized the Yoshida Doctrine. In 1967, Sato enunciated the “three nonnuclear principles”
that Japan would never possess or manufacture nuclear weapons, or permit their introduction into
its territory.96 In the same year, he formulated the policy of the “three principles of arms exports.”
The principles held that Japan would not allow the export of arms to (1) countries in the
Communist bloc, (2) countries subjected to arms embargoes under U.N. Security Council’s
resolutions, and (3) countries involved or likely to be involved in armed conflict. Subsequently,
the Miki administration (1974-76) tightened this ban on weapons exports to all countries and
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defined “arms” to include not only military equipment but also the parts and fittings used in such
equipment, practically prohibiting any sorts of arms-related export.
Meanwhile, limiting defense spending to less than 1 percent of GNP became the practice
in the 1960s, although it was not official government policy until adoption of National Defense
Program Outline in 1976. 97 In conjunction with this financial constraint, the Japanese
government further limited its military posture under “The Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy”
(Senshu Boei), introduced in the first Defense White Paper of 1970, which stipulated that the
country would only be allowed to use force in the event of an attack and to possess the minimum
level of force necessary for self-defense. Furthermore, in 1969, the Diet passed a resolution
limiting Japan’s activities in outer space to peaceful and nonmilitary purposes.
These antimilitarist policies implemented by Yoshida’s successors were also rendered
possible in “[t]he international environment of the 1960s,” which, Kosaka Masataka, a leading
international relations theorist, observed, “looked as though Heaven (ten) had created it for
Japan’s economic growth.”98 Given its relatively small economy at the time, the state did not
face an immediate need for an increased military role in international politics. The United States,
with its predominant economic and military power, was able to continue its commitment to the
international affairs and faced little need to rely on Japan’s economy or force for its security
strategy. Japan’s economic growth was rather favorable for Washington as it reduced the need for
U.S. economic aid to Japan and meant a stronger American ally in Asia. Also, the 1960 antitreaty
protest proved the strength of popular resistance to greater defense efforts and the dangers of a
socialist political surge. Therefore, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations were content to
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give priority to Japanese economic development, which they saw as a means to ensure Japan’s
stability and democratic development and also as an investment to foster a robust supporter of
Pax Americana in the long-term.99
The intensification of the protracted Vietnam War after the late 1960s, however,
renewed U.S. interest and determination to increase Japan’s contribution to Asian security. This
issue was raised again particularly during the Nixon administration in conjunction with the
reversion of Okinawa in 1972 and more broadly the Nixon Doctrine. As the United States was
determined to maintain its strategically important bases in Okinawa even after reversion, Sato
faced the need to show that Japan was ready to assume a larger regional security role by more
strongly supporting U.S. foreign policy in Eastern and Southeast Asia.100 Furthermore, while
marking the era of détente (1969-1979) by improving U.S. relations with the Soviet and China,
the Nixon Doctrine, announced in 1969, emphasized U.S. expectation for and dependence on its
Asian allies to assume greater responsibility for containing communism in the region.
Meanwhile, as the pacifists argued against renewed calls for Japan’s expanding security
role, the prolonging of the Vietnam conflict revitalized their agenda discourse in Japan. An
anti-Vietnam War civil-society movement spread nationwide, incorporating the existing pacifist
discourse and the anti-America sentiment among the political Left, especially among student
activists.101
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Facing this dilemma between U.S. pressure for rearmament and the domestic pacifist
antiwar movement, Prime Minister Sato made a minimal concession to U.S. demands. While
South Korea dispatched more than 300,000 troops to fight alongside with the American
counterparts in Vietnam, the Japanese government avoided any military involvement, satisfying
the pacifist constituents at home. Instead of military contribution, Sato only committed himself
to an increased economic assistance to regional security arrangements. Specifically, he assumed
a leading role in creating the Asian Development Bank (1966) and significantly increased his
country’s Official Development Aid (ODA) from approximately $100 million in the early 1960s
to $244 million in 1965 and $458 million in 1970.102 While the United States and its other Asian
allies were attempting to contain the Communist through military conflict, Japan took a different
approach to the Cold War by providing economic assistance to stabilize the domestic order of the
non-communist regimes in the region. Therefore, although the Vietnam War could have provided
Japan with a turning point for its minimalist military posture, the state maintained the existing
nonmilitaristic, economic-centered foreign policy.
In the 1970s, Japan faced a changing international security environment as the Cold War
détente emerged with the conclusion of the Vietnam War and the diplomatic reconciliation
between the United States and China. In response to this decline in the tension and the likeliness
of armed conflict between the East and the West, Japan further consolidated its minimalist
defense posture in the National Defense Program Outline in 1976. The outline served as the
official basis of the country’s defense planning for the decades to come, stipulating the “Basic
Defense Force Concept” (kibanteki boeiryoku koso).103 The Concept sets Japan’s defense goals
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as to maintain the “minimum necessary basic defense force” to “repel limited and small-scale
aggression, in principle, without external assistance” and, in case of larger assault (e.g., a
full-scale Soviet invasion), to “continue an unyielding resistance by mobilizing all available
forces until such time as cooperation from the United States is introduced, thus rebuffing such
aggression.”104 The outline was clearly a continuation of the Yoshida strategy, which favored
dependence on American military deterrence over the economically costly and politically
destabilizing alternative of developing a more autonomous defense posture. The outline even
adopted the aforementioned GNP1% cap on defense spending as a new restriction on the defense
establishment. Japan again embraced the Yoshida Doctrine.105
The last adjustment to the Yoshida strategy was the adaptation of “comprehensive
security policy” (sogo anzen hosho) under the Masayoshi Ohira administration (1978-1980).
Underlying this new approach to security was the idea that economic security is as important as
military security and that diplomacy should comprehensively accommodate military, economic,
and other diplomatic resources. It was emphasized that security takes many forms and that policy
instruments from different sectors of the government, in addition to more traditional military
instruments, can be used to secure the nation. 106 Therefore, when the détente collapsed after the

Japan, as an independent state, should maintain the minimum necessary basic defense forces lest it becomes a
destabilizing factor in the region by creating a power vacuum.”
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Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the United States demanded Japan greater military
efforts for the intensified Cold War, Japan increased its oversea aid and diplomatic efforts instead
of its military contribution. Specifically, Ohira promised to expedite the implementation of
Fukuda’s plan to double Japan’s ODA in five years and expanded the target of Japan’s overseas
aid to non-Asian countries.107 As a result, while Japan’s ODA was $458 million in 1970 and
mainly targeted to Asian countries, it surpassed $3.3 billion in 1980 and its scope became
increasingly global.108 With this positioning of such “strategic aid” as part of its “comprehensive
security policy,” Japan was again able to maintain its antimilitary posture in light of the
increasing international pressure for military buildup following the end of the détente. The
Yoshida doctrine was preserved and further enshrined in the heart of Japan’s security policy.

The 1980s: The Reemergence of Revisionist and Its Limited Successes
However, the mercantilist Yoshida strategy did not go unchallenged during the 1980s
due to the surge of the revisionist camp under the Yasuhiro Nakasone administration (1982-87).
This revisionist call for Japan’s greater defense posture, however, did not resonate with the
majority of the Japanese people who had come to view economic rather than martial prowess as
a constitutive feature of Japanese national identity. The new revisionist agenda realized limited
successes, leaving the Yoshida strategy intact as the guiding principle of Japan’s security policy.
As a longtime outspoken nationalist, Nakasone had been highly critical of the Yoshida’s
strategy.109 Despite his opposition to the mainstream Yoshida policy, Nakasone gained accidental
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accession to the prime minister’s office in 1982, when the LDP’s party factions were deadlocked
over a successor to Zenko Suzuki, who had abruptly resigned. Capitalizing on this opportunity,
Nakasone attempted to supplant the Yoshida strategy by consolidating his own revisionist grand
design for Japan’s foreign policy. The central tenet of Nakasone’s grand design was Japan’s
active global role in international strategic affairs, which he articulated as an “international
nation” (kokusai kokka). As the world’s second-largest economic power, Nakasone believed,
Japan was no longer a follower nation in the Western world but a state that can and should play a
leading role in international affairs, especially in military matters which the Yoshida Doctrine
barred.
Against this backdrop, in his first meeting with the newly elected President Ronald
Regan, Nakasone promised the reinforcement of the bilateral security arrangement and Japan’s
more active role in the alliance. In fact, before leaving for Washington, he granted a cabinet
approval of the transfer of purely military technology to the United States, which clearly marked
a major modification of the three principles on arms exports set forth by the Sato administration.
In Washington, Nakasone pledged Japan’s strategic commitment in the New Cold War, which
emerged after the collapse of détente. For instance, he forcefully stated that Japan would “have
complete and full control” of straits surrounding the Japanese land “so that there should be no
passage of Soviet submarines and other naval activities in time of emergency.”110 Going further,
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General MacArthur asking for constitutional revision and an independent defense establishment. Nakasone remained
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Nakasone stated that Japan should be “a big aircraft carrier” (okina koku bokan)—which was
translated by his official translator as “an unsinkable aircraft carrier” (fuchin kubo)—to prevent
penetration of the Soviet Backfire bombers into Japanese airspace.
Nakasone’s aggressive stance on security was also evident in the 1983 G8 Summit at
Williamsburg, the first summit that took up Western defense and East-West arms control as
issues for a joint statement. The main focus of the defense discussion was the removal of the
Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) SS-20 deployed in Europe by the Soviets. Despite the
conflicting interests between the Soviets and the United States, the summit was able to produce a
joint statement with strong language, thanks to Japan’s active advocacy of the U.S. initiative in
the negotiations.111 Nakasone came to the summit determined to demonstrate Japan was, in his
words, not “just an economic animal” and that the country was ready to speak out, to take stands,
and to bear responsibilities on matters important to the security and prosperity of the global
community. With this renewed active stance widely appreciated among the G8 nations,
especially the United States, the Williamsburg summit presented Japan a stage to show its
commitment to security issues from the global standpoint as an “international nation.”
Capitalizing on this international momentum, the Nakasone administration moved to
remove the GNP 1% ceiling on defense spending. In December 1986, the cabinet decided on a

operations and further elaborated on this idea in the 1983 defense white paper, which used the term “sea-line defense”
for the first time in a Japanese government official document.
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1987 defense expenditure that surpassed 1% of the projected GNP by 0.004 percent. In January
of the following year, the Nakasone administration officially abolished the 1 percent cap on
defense spending. While this move proved to be a matter of symbolism rather than actual policy
transformation (defense spending actually went back to under 1 percent after he left office and
has stayed so ever since then), it was a huge political win for the prime minister who came to
office declaring that it was time to address hitherto taboo topics, including defense, and “settle all
accounts on postwar political issues” (sengo seiji no sokessan).
Nakasone’s agenda also resonated with the political nationalism that emerged during the
1980s. Many high-profile media figures such as Shimizu Ikutaro, Ishihara Shintaro, and Eto Jun
led the resurgence of the nationalist discourse by appealing to national pride, and argued for the
revisionist agenda that Japan should acquire military power commensurate with its new
economic might and should exercise an independent foreign policy. They targeted criticism
toward the postwar political system and the Yoshida Doctrine, which they deemed as responsible
for the nation’s lack of independent policymaking. Many nationalists attacked that the “imposed”
postwar constitutional system deprived Japan of sovereign rights fundamental to a nation-state
including the rights of belligerency.112 Going further, the sociologist Ikutaro Shimizu advocated
Japan develop an independent deterrent capability, including even a nuclear arsenal.113
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Shimizu’s drastic call for militarization, however, became obsolete in the emerging
nationalist discourse, which increasingly focused on economic over military power after the
mid-80s. As tensions between the United States and Japan over trade and other economic issues
grew (e.g. U.S. “Japan Bashing”) through the 1980s, famous right-wing nationalist
commentators such as Jun Eto and Shintaro Ishihara increasingly concentrated on Japan’s
economic and technological prowess while deemphasizing the military security matter. 114 This
emphasis on economy was accompanied by a surge of anti-Americanism among the political
Right who began to vigorously attack the United States, using the bilateral trade friction to stir
up nationalist passions among the public.
Behind this shift in emphasis was a new focus on the economy as a source of nationalist
pride, or the consolidation of national identity as a “merchant nation.” Before 1945, Japan had
proudly identified itself as a warrior nation, the land of the samurai, whose martial values
distinguished it from the spiritually weak and corrupt West. In the 1980s, however, Japan came
to embrace a self-image as “a nation of merchants and manufacturers, endowed with a unique
propensity for producing high-quality goods that other people, including Americans, simply
could not match.” 115 For the economy-first-minded constituents, it was the Yoshida
strategy—not the nationalistic revisionist agenda of militarization and a greater military
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role—that proved the best approach to their nation’s security.116 Amidst the Japanese economic
bubble, a national consensus surrounding the Yoshida strategy was more potent than ever in the
postwar era.
Prime Minister Nakasone attempted to transform this mercantilist tone of the national
consensus by advocating a new Japan as an “international nation” that makes military
contributions to the international community with its enormous economic resources. And he did
succeed in articulating such a new vision of Japan’s role in world politics in an attempt to
supplant the mercantilist Yoshida strategy. However, the actual accomplishments in changing the
strategy were by no means transformative, since only slight modifications to the Yoshida
Doctrine were adopted. While bringing a new realism to the defense debate, Nakasone
committed Japan to assuming a larger security role and to greater cooperation with the Western
allies, especially the United States. His government played an important role in the 1983 G8
Summit to contain the threat of the Soviet INF. Nakasone modified, even if only in a limited way,
parts of the Yoshida policy such as the three principles on arms experts and the GNP 1 percent
ceiling on defense spending. When the United States demanded a military contribution to address
the Iranian naval mines in the Persian Gulf during the First Gulf War (1980-88), however,
Nakasone failed to dispatch the SDF for the minesweeping mission due to the constitutional
constraints and opposition from the public117 and even his own cabinet and party. He was forced
to stick to the nonmilitary approach of the Yoshida strategy such as economic assistance to that
116
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ongoing conflict.
Accordingly, Nakasone’s grand design of a new foreign policy met with limited
successes. Although the surrounding international environment had significantly altered since
Yoshida’s day, his strategy had proved its worth and gained wide support among the Japanese
politicians and constituents, who were enjoying the zenith of the nation’s economic growth. They
did indeed incorporate part of Nakasone’s vision of Japan’s new international leadership, but
only to the extent that “they envisioned nothing less than Japanese global leadership in economic
and technological development, the pioneering of a new technocratic society—in short, world
leadership in the nonmilitary aspects of the international system.”118 Put differently, consumed
in the prevailing economic nationalism, his rearticulation of Japan’s role in the changing
international environment was not able to consolidate a new national consensus but rather
reinforced the existing mercantilist identity. It was not until the end of the Cold War that the
country would come to seriously reconsider its national identity (the second “identity crisis”)
facing the new security challenges such as terrorism, North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats,
and China’s military buildup, and embrace a more robust military posture as a “normal nation.”

The Post-Cold War Era: The Rise of Normalist and Internationalist Identities
In this section, I discuss Japan’s identity construction and security policy during the
post-Cold War era, in which the nation faced significant changes in both domestic and
international environments that compelled reconsideration of the existing mercantilist, pacifist
identity. In this second “identity crisis,” two new identity groups emerged: internationalist and
normalist. While the former, retaining a similar vein of the Yoshida Doctrine, envisioned a
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“global civilian power,” a peaceful economic power that makes nonmilitary international
contribution to global order, the latter argued for Japan as a “normal nation” that possesses
military capability commensurate to its economic strength while assuming increased security
role in global politics.
As new post-Cold War security challenges intensified, the normalist has emerged as a
new hegemonic identity, strengthening defense posture and initiating a more assertive security
policy. Incorporating the internationalist principles into its foreign policy agenda, however, the
new “normal” Japan has not become a great military power uninhibited with regard to the use of
force for a pursuit of its interests or combat missions across the globe. Rather, it remains a
“middle power” seeking to contribute to a regional and global security order that is struggling to
meet the post-Cold War security challenges. Its contribution to international peace and security
remains nonmilitary and humanitarian, eschewing any military ambitions of a great power status.
As a result, the Yoshida strategy has not been displaced entirely but still resides at the heart of the
emerging “normal” security policy, and is likely to remain so for some time to come.

The 1990s: The Gulf War and the Second Identity Crisis
The nearly half-century-long Soviet-U.S. Cold War suddenly came to an end when the
collapses of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union shocked the entire world. With the end of the
Cold War, the world, including the Asia-Pacific region, witnessed a whole reconfiguration of the
international system. This structural change in international politics erased from the Japanese
policymakers’ minds the concerns that the country would be caught in the crossfire of a
Soviet-U.S. military conflict. But it also presented Japan new anxieties and challenges. With the
demise of its Cold War adversary, the United States, it was feared, would revert back to
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isolationism it had embraced before the outbreak of the World War II and withdraw its forward
military presence in the Asia-Pacific, leaving Japan exposed to deal with possible security
challenges on its own. This would mean an extermination of the bedrock of Japan’s postwar
Yoshida strategy—reliance on American security guarantee that enabled his mercantilist
economic-first agenda and pacifist security policy during the Cold War. The new world order
was beginning to raise serious questions about the relevance of the nation’s existing posture, or
identity, as a “merchant nation” and a “peace nation.”
Arguably, the most significant post-Cold War external shock to Japan was the Gulf War
(1990-1991), which revealed the inadequacy of the nation’s traditional mercantilist, pacifist
standing in the new security environment. The war was a turning point in Japan’s foreign policy
and identity. “This crisis was a major time of testing for Japan as a nation of peace and the most
severe trial we have faced since the end of the war (WWII),”119 observed then Prime Minister
Toshiaki Kaifu in the Foreign Ministry’s Bluebook of 1991.
In facing the first major international crisis in the post-Cold War world, the international
community called on Japan to dispatch the Self-Defense Force to the Middle East as part of the
multilateral, UN-sanctioned peacekeeping force initiated by the United States. This seemingly
straightforward task proved to be intractable, however, due to the existing constitutional ban of
SDF overseas dispatch under Article 9120 and the pacifist public’s opposition.121 Ichiro Ozawa
and his allies within LDP (who later formed the normalist camp) attempted to pass a legislative
119
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bill that would allow the overseas dispatch under the existing constitutional framework, but in
vain. Following the failure of this bill, the Diet resorted to a hefty financial contribution of $13
billion for the war effort against Iraq—which surpassed Japan’s ODA in 1991, approximately
$11 billion and the largest ODA disbursement by a single country in the same year.
Consequently, Japan failed to make a meaningful “human resource” contribution, falling
short even of Korea’s dispatch of 150 medics and the Philippines’ contribution of 190 doctors
and nurses. Funded by $13 billion in aid from Japan,122 the U.S.-led coalition force implemented
its operation in the Persian Gulf without the presence of a Japanese force. Despite its significant
monetary contribution, Japan received little international gratitude or recognition. The Japanese
government was not able to gain official acknowledgement for its financial support by the
Kuwait government. Neither was it able to make its voice heard in the decision-making
regarding the UN action, as Japan was excluded from the negotiation among the permanent
members of the UN Security Council on how to respond to the Iraq-Kuwait crisis—a traumatic
experience for Foreign Ministry officials. 123 The Japanese government came under harsh
criticism from the international community, which dismissed its $13 billion contribution as
“checkbook diplomacy.” It was not until it sent the SDF for a minesweeping mission in the
Persian Gulf—the first-ever overseas deployment of the SDF124—that the country finally gained
international recognition.
This shaming experience was a wake-up call for Japan. The Gulf Crisis demonstrated
the enormous gap between the nation’s economic might and its immature political prowess and
122
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still-low level of real internationalization. The traditional low-posture foreign policy that had
focused primarily on economic objectives and means, and that had worked so well in the past,
was no longer sufficient. The Gulf Crisis also challenged the Japanese people’s perception about
international politics. During the Cold War era, Japan maintained a pacifist cocoon, it was the
single country in the world where its citizens seriously debated the legitimacy of possessing
force and waging self-defense war—it was a unique, if not unrealistic, national stance satirized
as “one-country pacifism.” This was rendered possible partly because of the large opposition
Socialist Party and other left-wing parties such as the Communist Party, all of which
continuously denied the legitimacy of the SDF and the right of self-defense. More important was
the fact that, under the “1955 system,” the mercantilist LDP government avoided a confrontation
with the pacifist opposition under “a tacit agreement with socialist and pacifist groups that
divisive issues of constitutional revision and substantial military spending would be moderated
and priority given to economic growth and social welfare.”125
In this political environment, the public and even politicians shunned away from
nationwide discussions of their country’s security role and responsibility in maintaining the
world order. All of that was blown in the Gulf Crisis, which revealed the inadequacy of Japan’s
international contribution to the global security order. The crisis, one analyst observed,
“crystallized and magnified the issues that Japan should have addressed long ago, but did not. To
Japan, the Gulf Crisis was, in a way, ‘the day of reckoning.’”126
Amid this predicament, an emerging security instability in East Asia attacked the
now-fragile standing of the pacifist nation. In 1993, the United States discovered a secret North
Korea nuclear weapons program. Concerned about a possible use of the nuclear technology for
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missile warheads, the United States and other Asian countries negotiated with the North Korean
government to halt its nuclear experiment. But both sides were unable to come to an agreement,
compelling the United States to consider bombing the North Korean nuclear facility and South
Korea to evacuate residents in Seoul, and intensifying the likeliness of armed conflict in the
Korean Peninsula to a level not seen since the Korean War. While this rising tension temporarily
abated after the 1994 conclusion of the Six-Party Agreed Framework, the 1998 launch of the
North Korean Taepodong missile over mainland Japan alerted the Japanese that their country
could come under attack from its belligerent neighbor. Another uncertainty rose from China,
which conducted a large-scale military exercise, even missile firings, in the Taiwan Strait in 1996.
While the Chinese government stopped its provocative action when the Clinton administration
dispatched two U.S. aircraft carrier groups to the strait, this incident reminded the Japanese
citizens that the old balance-of-power game was not in fact a thing of the past. In short, all these
developments, according to some experts, alarmed many Japanese that “national security could
not be taken for granted.”127
Moreover, the mercantilist nation also faced challenges in the economic realm. The
1997 East Asian financial crisis revealed the fragility of the regional economy Japan had
attempted to promote for decades, and how vulnerable the Japanese economy had become in the
globalization era. Also, the miraculous postwar Japanese economic growth that seemed to last
forever suddenly collapsed after the financial bubble burst in 1991. A decade of economic
stagnation following the financial meltdown certainly undermined Japan’s self-confidence in
economic and commercial matters, questioning the one-dimensional economy-first policy that
the nation had cultivated and embraced so dearly since 1945.
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New Identity Groups: Internationalist and Normalist
It was soon recognized that what was needed for Japan was a formation of a new role in
the radically changing environment of the post-Cold War order. The country faced a task of
reconstructing its identity, or an “identity crisis.” In this second round of postwar identity
construction, there emerged two competing views of national purpose and interest (i.e., identity
groups): internationalist and normalist stances whose ideals originate from mercantilist and
revisionist positions, respectively. Meanwhile, the pacifist camp retreated from the political
forefront, and its antimilitarist ideals were carried forward by the internationalist group.
The internationalist, adhering to the tenets of the Yoshida Doctrine, argued that Japan
should continue its role as a “global civilian power” (a term first coined by Yoichi Funabashi, an
influential journalist and columnist): a peaceful economic state making (nonmilitary)
contributions to international society. 128 This new strategy, according to Funabashi, stems from
Japan’s unorthodox power portfolio (“economic giant and military dwarf”), which gives the
nation a golden opportunity to define its power and role in the radically changing post-Cold War
world. In the new world of increasing interdependence, the salience of economic power triumphs
that of military power, and Japan should search for various avenues of enhancing political power
based on economic strength, not on military might, to contribute to international society. To this
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end, Funabashi said, “Japan must pursue two psychologically conflicting mindsets and
styles—active engagement in world peace and self-restraint as a military power…. Japan should
push forward along the path of a global civilian power with its interests reaching well beyond its
regional confines, while its military posture is limited to the self-defense of its islands.”129 As
for promoting world peace, the nation’s security policy should derive its legitimacy from
international institutions such as the United Nations rather than resorting to unilateral actions.
The internationalists therefore approve of the SDF’s participation in UN PKO missions, but only
nonmilitary ones.
Further developing this internationalist strategy, Yoshihide Soeya introduced the concept
of “middle power diplomacy,” foreign policy that is motivated by its desire to play a greater and
more active role in promoting international peace and security, or by what he calls “pacifism
with an internationalist bent.”130 Japan, according to Soeya, should act like other middle powers
such as Canada and Germany by remaining a trading nation which renounces traditional great
power ambitions and contributes to international security under multinational auspices. It is
therefore necessary for Japan to demonstrate its Asian neighbors that it has no great power
aspirations by continuing promoting economic growth across the region rather than acting like a
great power. Middle power internationalists, while maintaining the alliance with the United
States, would regard important overlapping regional trade and security regimes to maintain
friendly relations with other Asian countries. Japan, according to them, should remain a largely
unmilitarized U.S. ally that makes international contributions by cooperating with other
advanced industrial countries, provides economic assistance to developing countries, and helps
129

Funabashi Yoichi, “Introduction,”13.
Yoshihide Soeya, Nihon no Midoru Pawaa Gaiko; i.d. “A ‘Normal’ Middle Power: Interpreting Changes in
Japanese Security Poilicy in the 1990s and After,” in Japan as a “Normal Country”?: A Nation in Search for Its
Place in the World ed. by Yoshihide Soeya, Masayuki Tadokoro, and David A. Welch (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2011), 89.
130

58

to maintain the international order. If the United States is the indispensible global police, Japan
should position itself as the indispensible global merchant.131 The advocates of this middle,
civilian power stance includes the members of the Kochikai—a LDP faction that had been a
populated by the Yoshida’s followers—such as Hiromu Nonaka, Yohei Kono, Kiichi Miyazawa,
and

Koichi Kato.
Countering this internationalist view, the normalists call for an incremental armament

for national defense and accept a military approach to maintain international peace and stability.
On their account, Japan as a “normal nation” (futsu no kuni) should rearm itself to take more
responsibility for its own self-defense, especially in the U.S.-Japan security alliance, and deploy
the SDF overseas to assist Japan’s allies, particularly the United States, or to take part in UN-led
security arrangements. The term “normal nation” was first coined by Ichiro Ozawa in the midst
of the mounting international criticism toward Japan’s insufficient response to the Gulf War.
Acknowledging the denouncement of Japan as a free-rider on international security and asking
“how can Japan, which so depends on world peace and stability, seek to exclude a security role
for its international contribution?,”132 Ozawa has forcefully argued that its political passivism is
“abnormal,” and that Japan as a “normal” nation should assume greater international
responsibilities, including military ones.133 Making Japan a normal nation is not necessarily
about becoming a rearmed, militarist Japan, however, as Ozawa contends: “this is, quite simply,
not an issue of militarization or aspirations to military superpower status. It is a question of
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Japan’s responsible behavior in the international community.”134 And yet, this normal security
policy still departs from the long-dominant Yoshida strategy that has deemphasized Japan’s
military role.
Contending that Japan must shoulder more of the burden of maintaining international
order through military cooperation with the United States or other like-minded developed
countries, the normalists advocate more a proactive security policy and extensive SDF use.
Specifically, they argue that Japan should enter into collective defense arrangements through the
U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty or the United Nations. To this end, they recognize the need to
revise Article 9 of the Peace Constitution that significantly limits the parameters of the SDF
operations, including the right of collective self-defense. The recognition of collective
self-defense, along with an adequate military buildup, would allow Japan to take a more active
role in maintaining world peace, as well as a more reciprocal role to defend its own islands and
its ally the United States under the bilateral security alliance. In revising the constitution, the
normalists also advocate for establishing a formal “military” (guntai) instead of “self-defense
force” (jieitai).135
This new military posture, the normalists argue, is especially important given the
status-quo of East Asia, where significant security uncertainties loom around China’s rapid
military expansion and North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. In addition, defending Japan
is not the only agenda for U.S. policymakers, and the United States has been experiencing a
relative decline on the world stage and might not be able to protect Japan in times of need.136 As
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for nuclear options, some right-leaning nationalists such as Shintaro Ishihara argue that Japan
should not be longer dependent on the United States, and advocate for Japan’s autonomous
defense coupled with nuclear capabilities.137 However, such drastic calls for remilitarization
remain controversial among the normalists, the majority of whom are content with bilateral
security cooperation. While still adhering to the Yoshida rhetoric of Japan as a peace-loving
nation and accepting the U.S.-Japan alliance as the center pillar of security policy, the
mainstream normalists believes that Japan as a normal nation should establish a stronger defense
policy and do what it takes, including militarily, to maintain peace inside and outside its own
islands.
The advocates of this worldview include Juichiro Koizumi, Shinzo Abe, and Shigeru
Ishiba, who came to form Japan’s “new conservative mainstream” to supplant the traditional
mercantilist mainstream of the Yoshida School, and therefore subverting the middle power
internationalists in the national security discourse. But this normalist overtake of domestic
politics had to wait until the election of Koizumi as a prime minister in 2001, for the balance of
power was still in favor of the internationalists during the 1990s, when the Japanese people were
slowly adapting from the Yoshida consensus to the new reality. This political positioning
between the two competing identity groups led the normalists to incorporate the internationalists’
soft-power foreign policy approach, and to renounce any great power ambitions of full-blown
rearmament and global military reach. As one former senior diplomat suggests, “Any notion that
Japan had of itself as a great power was pitiably smashed (mijime ni uchikudaku)” in the
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1990s.138 As a result, Japan’s new security policy and identity seems to be somewhere in
between, or a mosaic of, the internationalist and normalist approaches. Certainly, this new
“normal” Japan is not a traditional “normal” great military power equipped with full-scale
rearmament, including a nuclear arsenal, and willing to use its military prowess to pursue its
national interests.

International Contribution and Peacekeeping Operations
The originator of the normalist position, as already mentioned, was Ichiro Ozawa, who
initiated a series of political experiments in the aftermath of the Gulf War. In light of the
international criticism of “checkbook diplomacy,” Ozawa and his allies became more determined
to increase Japan’s international profile. Japan, he argued, “must do thing normally, in the same
way as everyone else.” 139 Ozawa dismissed the government’s longstanding policy of the
constitution bans on overseas deployment of the SDF as a “subterfuge” (gomakashi) of the
Yoshida strategy, which he said has made Japan selfish and money-grubbing, not shouldering the
cost of maintaining the international freedom and peace on which the Japanese economy
depended.140 Impatient with the LDP’s inability to deal with the crisis in Japanese foreign policy,
Ozawa and his allies challenged the party’s mainstream leadership and pushed for legislation that
would allow SDF participation in collective security efforts by the United Nations such as UN
PKO.
Following intense debate, the normalists finally succeeded in passing the UN
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Peacekeeping Operations Cooperation Bill (the PKO Law) on June 15, 1992, which ended the
ban on the overseas deployment of the SDF, which had been a key aspect of the Yoshida strategy.
In passing the bill, however, the normalist leaders had to converge their policy stance with that of
the opposition parties and other LDP members who held internationalist views. When the initial
submission of the PKO Law was struck down, the LDP government, led by the mainstream
internationalist Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, made several concessions to the centrist Komei
Party and the Socialist Democratic Party when submitting the new version. As a result, the new
legislation limited SDF deployment to logistical and humanitarian support, monitoring elections,
and providing aid in civil administration.141 In short, although the ban on overseas dispatching
of the SDF was lifted for the first time—a huge step for becoming a “normal nation”—the
deployment was restricted to nonmilitary missions, which made the new legislation palatable to
the internationalists in the center.
After the passage of the PKO Law, the government dispatched the SDF for its first
foreign mission, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), in September
1992. The SDF sent 41 civilians (for election monitoring), 75 civilian officers, 8 SDF military
observers, and 600 SDF construction personnel for road and bridge repair to Cambodia. The
mission was responsible for the daunting nation-building project, and was a test case for the
first-time-deployed Japanese peacekeepers, and for the Japanese, who showed fragile support for
that deployment. In fact, when a Japanese volunteer, not part of the official mission, and a
Japanese policeman were killed in the spring of 1993, the Japanese media went into a “feeding
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frenzy,” reflecting the public’s shock at this first loss of Japanese life on foreign soil.142 Despite
the increasing popular calls for withdrawing the SDF from Cambodia, the government made a
bold decision to continue the mission, arguing that the incident did not mean a collapse of the
peace agreement. This judgment later proved correct, when elections in Cambodia were held
smoothly with an almost 90 percent voter turnout, granting legitimacy and local support for the
reconstruction process.
This successful completion of the Cambodian operation in September 1993 marked an
important point in the slow evolution of Japan’s international role and its public’s opinion. When
the Diet debated the PKO Law in the spring of 1992, public opinion was divided in half. Public
support for the Cambodian operation was fragile as the peace agreement process met many
difficulties, including the loss of Japanese life along the way. When the UNTAC turned out to be
successful, however, the majority of the Japanese came to support the SDF participation in the
operation with an increasingly positive attitude toward the multilateral framework. Surprisingly,
59 percent of the public supported the participation and 36 percent opposed it; 68 percent viewed
UN PKO “useful” for maintaining peace and 28 percent disagreed with such a view. 143 In
addition, constitutional revision for increasing international contribution such as UN PKO gained
majority support increasing from 23 percent in 1986 to 33 percent in 1991 to 50 percent in
March 1993, while opposition declined from 57 percent to 51 percent to 33 percent.144 The
disappearance of the long-dominant taboo of discussing constitutional revision indicated a
departure from the old political landscape.
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And yet, public opinion remained cautious when the PKO missions would involve
military operations. During the Cambodian mission, 66 percent of the Japanese worried about the
government expanding the role of the SDF beyond humanitarian and reconstruction missions.
Another polls conducted in 1991 and 1993 suggested that the large majorities (63 percent and 74
percent, respectively) of the public did not believe that Japan had a responsibility “to give
military assistance in trouble spots around the world when it is asked by allies.”145 A 1994
public poll showed that 70.5 percent expressed their support for SDF participation in
peacekeeping, but that 71.6 percent opposed expanding participation into peacekeeping
operations involving the use of force.146 Clearly, the Japanese people were not prepared to see
their troops engaging in armed conflict but only in humanitarian operations. Meanwhile, the
Prime Minister’s Office poll demonstrated an increase in support for SDF participation in
disaster relief operation overseas. The number went up from 54.2 percent in 1991 to 61.6 percent
in 1994 and 78.0 percent in 1997 and 86.3 in 2000.147 These data demonstrate that the Japanese
people increasingly recognized a distinction between overseas deployments for nonmilitary
activities (kaigai haken) (such as humanitarian and reconstruction missions) and deployments for
the sake of using military force (kaigai hahei). Obviously, the public was supportive of the
former but not of the latter. They viewed nonmilitary, civilian approaches to resolving conflict
more effective.
Under the slogan of “international contribution” (kokusai koken), the Japanese people
began to accept Japan’s new international role, or its “normal” posture in the changing security
environment of the post-Cold War world. Following the Cambodian operation, the government
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expanded the SDF PKO missions, sending SDF personnel to Mozambique (1993-1995), Rwanda
(1994), Golan Heights (1996), and East Timor (2002-2005) for UN peacekeeping and other
humanitarian activities. This new security role, however, remained nonmilitary and was mainly
motivated by humanitarian reasons of promoting world peace rather than aspirations to become a
great military power.

The Falls of Normalists and Pacifists
Despite the success in expanding the SDF security role, after passing the PKO Law the
normalist agenda of boosting up Japan’s military establishment was stymied. For Japan to truly
become a “normal nation,” Ozawa and his allies were determined to end the “1955 system” that
had allowed mainstream mercantilist control of foreign policy and maintained the Yoshida
Doctrine. And they did so by initiating the June 1993 groundbreaking upheaval in the political
system including creating a seven-party “rainbow” coalition government without the LDP.
However, the normalists’ days did not last long, with their political support soon collapsing due
to the fragile coalition among opposition parties. In June 1994, the government again fell into the
hands of the LDP, but this time under the LDP-JSP (Japan Socialist Party) coalition headed by
the JSP leader Tomiichi Murayama—a steadfast pacifist who had viciously opposed Ozawa’s
normalist policies including the PKO Law—as a new prime minister. Ozawa’s normalist agenda
was put to an end.
The election of the Socialist leader as the new prime minister precipitated an
unanticipated outcome—a collapse of the Socialist Party. The Socialist Party, under Murakami,
came into office for the first time in forty-seven years since the 1947 Katayama administration,
but it entailed a huge cost. In building a coalition with the LDP, the leader of the pacifist party
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had to abandon all the important ideological positions his party had vociferously maintained
since its establishment. For almost a half century, the Socialists had opposed the Self-Defense
Force as unconstitutional, denied the legitimacy of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, and
supported unarmed neutrality. They had boycotted the vote on the PKO Law, which allowed the
overseas dispatching of the SDF. Murayama abruptly reversed the party’s policies on all these
issues. His abandonment of these party stances marked the end of the opposing axis in security
matters that distinguished pacifists from the opposing views of mercantilists and revisionists.
Moreover, in the June 1995, a Socialist-drafted Diet antiwar resolution (fusen ketsugi)
expressing “deep remorse” for Japan’s past military aggression and “renewing the determination
for peace”148 was largely rewritten by the LDP and voted on in the Diet. While this sort of
resolution usually gains the Diet’s approval with unanimous votes, more representatives (241)
abstained than supported it (230). Clearly, “pacifism’s day was passing.” 149 At the end,
Murayama resigned shortly after the 1996 general election, in which the Socialist Party suffered
its worst defeat in the postwar era. The party was penalized by former supports who resented the
party’s renouncement of its longstanding pacifist values. The most viable opposition party during
the Cold War—once holding 136 seats (out of 512) in the Diet—was left with only single-digit
representation by the early 2000s.
This marginalization of the Socialist Party, however, was not only a result of its own
suicidal move to abandon the pacifist ideals. These ideals were becoming increasingly
anachronistic in the changing post-Cold War security environment. The central tenet of the
party’s pacifist stance—“unarmed neutrality”—lost its relevance once the Cold War conflict
ended. Given the disappearance of the blocs in relation to which Japan should maintain neutrality,
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only unarmament and the anti-base movement were left on the pacifists’ agendas. But
unarmament proved to be an unattractive, if not an unrealistic, position when North Korea
suddenly withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and began to run its course to
become a nuclear state. This increased regional security uncertainty contributed to the “awaking”
of the Japanese public to national security issues. 150 In the wake of the following 1996 Taiwan
Strait Crisis and the 1998 North Korean missile launch, the Japanese people began to openly
discuss military threats. Moreover, the social status of the SDF—which the Socialists deemed
unconstitutional during the Cold War—had been steadily improving and gaining strong popular
support.151 Pacifism, at least in a strict sense of keeping Japan unarmed, no longer resonated
with the public.

Pacifism in a New Form
These political losses of the Socialist Party’s presence and its pacifist stances, however,
did not necessarily mean that the principles of pacifism had vanished from the public debate.
Rather, post-Cold War pacifism took a new form. Postwar pacifism was a forthright rejection of
any military activities, emerging from deep remorse about the nation’s past military aggressions.
The pacifism of this period did not distinguish wars of aggression, wars of self-defense, and wars
for the sake of international security. It was widely assumed that any mode of military activity
would lead to a revival of militarism. And yet, the Gulf War demonstrated the lack of Japan’s
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contribution to international security, and the successful UNTAC operation the fruitfulness of
such contributions. The Japanese people came to recognize their nation’s international security
cooperation and to distinguish between the three categories of war, while at the same time
supporting pacifism and the philosophy of international accord. This emerging pacifism, however,
was different from the existing one in that while condemning wars of aggression and mindless
nationalism, factors that had led to Japan’s defeat in the WWII, the Japanese began to appreciate
security activities grounded in a healthy spirit of international accord.152
Both normalists and internationalists then adopted these new pacifist ideals, promoting
the notion of Japan’s “international contribution” to maintaining world peace, while they
disagreed over whether the contribution should be made militarily. The government came to
allow SDF foreign deployments after the passage of the PKO Law, but the operation avoided any
armed missions and remained mainly humanitarian. Pacifism may have not survived in its strict
terms of forthright rejection of any military activities but still continued to influence policy
decisions in terms of the emerging internationalism. In fact, the 1995 National Defense Program
Outline—in which the Japanese government, for the first time in twenty years, comprehensively
reviewed its security posture—emphasized Japan’s contribution to international society. Given
the passage of the PKO Law few years earlier, the new NDPO added two new missions to the
SDF’s portfolio: disaster relief and international peacekeeping.
Moreover, this soft-power approach, which was further developed under the Keizo
Obuchi’s administration (1998-2000), adopted “human security” as a pillar of Japanese security
policy. In response to the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the Japanese government, along with South
Korea and China, took the initiative in establishing ASEAN+3 to promote regional economic
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cooperation. At the ASEAN+3 summit in December 1998, Obuchi expressed his concerns
regarding the crisis’ impacts on human security in the region such as the well-being and
development of the socially vulnerable segments of the population. Acting on such ideas, he
announced a total $4.2 million ODA package to establish a “Human Security Fund” under the
United Nations—later renamed the Trust Fund for Human Security—to assist neighboring Asian
countries in need, and to promote human security projects by UN agencies around the world.

Preparing for a “Normal” Security Policy
While these moves represented a soft-power, internationalist approach in line with Japan
as a “global civilian power,” there was also a slow evolution toward normalization. While it
maintained the Basic Defense Force Concept, the new NGPO identified emerging security
uncertainties in Asia and upgraded the U.S.-Japan security alliance in the event of a regional
crisis, calling for establishing “multi-functional, flexible, and effective defense forces” to meet
these security challenges. In the post-Cold War world, the bilateral security alliance, which first
began as part of U.S. strategy to contain the Soviet Union, now found its new values in
addressing regional security challenges. The 1996 U.S. Joint Declaration on Security reaffirmed
these new values, reemphasizing the importance of the bilateral security cooperation in the
post-Cold War and stipulating that such cooperation is not limited to Japan’s national defense and
bilateral framework but includes regional and global security. The declaration also recommended
revision of the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, which took place in the
following year. The new guidelines identified specific terms of possible security cooperation
regarding “situations in areas surrounding Japan” (shuhen jitai) and declared that Japan would
now take fuller responsibility for defense of such areas, a move that one analyst has called “a
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significant upgrade of operability in responding to regional contingencies.”153
These new security commitments marked a bold step toward upgrading, or
“normalizing,” Japan’s security posture in the changing post-Cold War security environment.
Whether such commitments were to be put into tangible action, however, remained to be seen in
the 1990s. The real test came as the world welcomed the twenty-first century, in which Japan
encountered a series of security challenges—terrorism, intensifying North Korean nuclear and
missile tests, and China’s rapid military buildup and renewed assertiveness in the region—that
posed serious policy questions to the normalist leaders.

The 2000s: The Era of Normalism
As Japan entered the twenty-first century, it welcomed in Juichiro Koizumi as its new
prime minister (2001-06). Koizumi was certainly a new type of leader in Japanese politics. He
had been calling for groundbreaking political reforms, and appealing for public dissatisfaction
with the government’s inability to reform the country during the so-called “lost decade” of
economic stagnation and political disarray. Attacking party faction politics and the cozy
relationships between party institutions and bureaucracies as the “cancer” of incompetent
postwar Japanese politics, he pledged to “destroy the LDP” (jiminto wo bukkowasu) and start a
new kind of politics. As a result, Koizumi came into office with overwhelming popular support.
Keeping his promise, he and his allies effectively weakened the influence of factions in his party,
including the now-splintered Kochikai, which had been a clusterof Yoshida’s followers (i.e. the
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Cold-War mercantilists and the post-Cold War internationalists).154 Instead of forging political
support based on factions and interest groups, he initiated a new type of populist politics that
appealed to public support via political performances through which he was able to implement
new policies. In his five years of prime ministership—the longest term since the Sato
administration (1964-72)—Koizumi and his allies initiated a series of new normalist policies
amidst sweeping popular support, which previously went unimplemented due to the
internationalist opposition from his own party and other opposition parties during the 1990s.
A political stage for the new normalist policies was in fact already in place with the
election of the George W. Bush administration in the United States. Criticizing the Clinton
administration’s accommodative approach to China and North Korea, President Bush made it
clear that the U.S.-Japanese alliance was the central pillar of U.S. foreign policy in Asia. Acting
on this idea, he appointed Richard L. Armitage, a pro-Japan veteran and politician who was one
of the masterminds of that new foreign policy strategy, as the Deputy Secretary of State.155 U.S.
policymakers at the time were determined to encourage Japan to increase its international role
while respecting its autonomy, and with the ultimate goal of bilateral relations to the level of
U.S.-U.K. relation.156 Prime Minister Koizumi was quick to respond to Bush’s love call by
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visiting the United States and establishing a close personal relationship with the new President.

Supporting the War on Terror
Japan’s strengthening bilateral relationship first came under scrutiny when on
September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda affiliated terrorists mounted the first attack on the U.S. soil since
Pearl Harbor. Pledging to fight the terrorist threats, President Bush declared the beginning of the
“war on terror” a few days before U.S. Congress officially did so on September 20. In response
to these developments, Prime Minister Koizumi visited the United States two weeks after the
tragedy in order to express Japan’s steadfast support for the new war effort. This
uncharacteristically responsive move was largely the result of the lessons learned during the Gulf
War, during which Japan was unable to swiftly or substantively contribute to the U.S.-led war
effort and was consequently snubbed by the international community. After 9/11, Japan was
determined not to make the same mistake again.
In October 2011 when the United States initiated Operation Enduring Freedom in
Afghanistan, the Koizumi administration swiftly passed a special anti-terrorism legislation and
moved to provide tactical support for the US war effort. By providing offshore, rear-area,
noncombat logistical support for the US-sanctioned coalition and deploying Aegis-equipped
destroyers and tankers to shuttle fuel to coalition navies in the Indian Ocean, Koizumi sought to
demonstrate that the SDF was prepared to play a larger-than-ever role in a war effort—a
revolutionary development for postwar pacifist Japan.
The war in Afghanistan was only a beginning of the emerging war on terrorism. After
President Bush delivered his famous 2002 State of Union Address condemning Iraq, Iran, and
North Korea as the “axis of evil,” the so-called “second stage” of the U.S. global war against
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terrorism commenced. Under its new anti-terrorism strategy, the United States began to wage a
war against Iraq on March 20, 2003 under the U.S.-led “Coalition of the Willing,” without
explicit U.N. approval. Despite fierce domestic opposition and concerns about invasion’s
legitimacy, especially from the internationalists who emphasized the necessity of a U.N.
resolution to justify the war effort, Prime Minister Koizumi immediately expressed his support
for the controversial military intervention. In response, the Japanese government approved the
deployment of a small contingent group of SDF ground troops for humanitarian and
infrastructure missions. The mission itself was limited to “noncombat” zones—which were
controversially defined by Koizumi as “the area where the SDF is operating.”157 Regardless of
whether the area was actually a noncombat zone, this operation marked the first deployment of
the SDF into an active conflict. This deployment marked a turning point in Japan’s postwar
security policy. After nearly a half century of de facto nonparticipation in maintaining
international security, the country found itself supporting, and dispatching its forces in, the global
war on terrorism.

Coping with the Security Challenges in East Asia
The emerging terrorist threat was not the only security concern for the Japanese
policymakers. Instability in East Asia intensified as North Korea periodically continued its
nuclear and missile tests for more than a decade. Of equal or possibly more importance was the
rise of China as an economic and military power. Such concerns were well reflected in the new
2004 National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG, previously called NDPO). While calling the
North Korean nuclear and missile programs “a major destabilizing factor to regional and
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international security,” the NDPG was the first national document that openly identified a
potential threat from China, noting that the country was seeking to “modernize its nuclear forces
and missile capabilities as well as its naval and air forces” while “expanding its area of operation
at sea.”158 The Japanese public was also increasingly alarmed. A China-Japan joint public
polling conducted in 2006 showed that 72.4 percent of Japanese respondents identified North
Korea as a military threat while 42.8 percent also identified China as such.159
The NDPG also identified “new threats and diverse situations,” including ballistic
missile attacks (by North Korea and China), attacks by guerrillas and special forces, aggression
against oceanic islands, intrusion into territorial air and maritime space (i.e. Chinese intrusion
into Japanese territorial waters and airspace near the Senkaku Islands), and large-scale disasters.
In addressing these various security challenges, the NDPG, in line with the previous NDPO,
declared that Japan needed to develop “multi-functional, flexible, and effective defense forces
that are highly ready, mobile, adaptable and multi-purpose, and are equipped with state-of-the-art
technologies and intelligence capabilities measuring up to the military-technological level of
other major countries.” Against this backdrop, the NDPG set the agenda for the augmentation of
Japan’s defensive and potentially offensive power-projection capabilities.160
Alongside these military procurements, the most significant and controversial
development in the early 2000s was arguably the introduction of Japan’s ballistic missile defense
(BMD) system. The BMD project first started as a joint research project between the United
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States and Japan in the wake of the 1998 North Korea missile test. The 2003 government
officially announced deployment of the BMD system, including Aegis-type destroyers with the
Standard Missile System (SM-3) and ground-to-air Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3)
lower-tier. The North Korean missile threat was the prime justification for the deployment,
although the BMD could also be mobilized to counter increasing Chinese ballistic missile
capabilities, which the 2004 NDPG noted. Furthermore, when issuing the 2004 NDGP, the
Koizumi cabinet also decided to proceed with the co-development of BMD with the United
States in December 2004—clearly violating the self-imposed ban on the export of arms.161 The
BMD deployment raised questions about its use for collective self-defense, as it could be used to
intercept missiles targeted toward third parties, specifically the United States. 162
In addressing North Korea’s missile threat, the Japanese government also responded by
expanding its use of outer space. In response to the 1998 North Korean missile launch, the
government announced its plan to deploy surveillance satellites, although such moves would
possibly contradict the 1969 principle of the nation’s “peaceful use of space.” Between 2003 and
2007—occasioned by the 2006 North Korean missile launch—Japan launched four nationally
produced intelligence-gathering satellites in order to monitor North Korea’s missile bases.
Furthermore, in March 2006, the LDP shifted from the 1969 interpretation of “peaceful” (heiwa
no mokuteki) as meaning “nonmilitary” (higunji), announcing its intention to allow the use of
161
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space for what it called “nonoffensive defensive purposes.” In June 2007, the party introduced a
new Basic Law for Space Activities, which states that Japan will conduct activities in space in
compliance with the principles of the constitution, thereby permitting the use of space for
“defensive” purposes.163
Despite the controversial nature of BMD and its use of space for military purposes,
these moves toward militarization gained widespread support among Japanese lawmakers and
the public. The decisions on the joint development and deployment of strategically important
BMD overcame differences among the relevant ministries and gained strong support from both
LDP and DPJ members. 164 The deployment of the BMD system also appeared to enjoy
considerable support from the public. A 2006 national poll found that 56.6 percent (25 percent
strongly, 31.6 somewhat) support missile defense, versus only 25.1 percent (8.9 percent strongly,
16.2 percent somewhat) opposing it. The government’s decision to speed up the process of
deploying BMD system following the 2006 North Korean missile and nuclear tests gained
support from the LDP-led ruling coalition as well as the opposition DPJ. When LDP Prime
Minister Taro Aso (2008-09) announced the deployment of the BMD system in April 2009 to
intercept North Korean missiles, an overwhelming 74.7 percent of the public supported the
decision, while only 16 percent opposed it. 165 The new legislation regarding the use of space
also gained widespread support from the Diet, including the Komeito Party and the opposition
DPJ. Clearly, Japanese politicians and public were increasingly alarmed about the North Korean
security threat. As a result, despite the controversial nature of the BMD and military use of space,
the Japanese appeared to be increasingly tolerant of their nation’s new “normal” security posture.
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In tandem with Japan’s domestic military buildup, the government increased
international security cooperation with its partners, including Australia and India, under the
auspices of the U.S.-Japan alliance. In May 2005, the Koizumi government, with its U.S. and
Australian counterparts, established an annual Trilateral Security Dialogue (TSD) in order to
strengthen bilateral links with Australia and embed Japan within the wider structure of the U.S.
alliance while increasing U.S. regional security ties. Prime Minister Koizumi and his successor,
Shinzo Abe (2006-07), appeared to perceive the trilateral talks as an important means of
mobilizing the three key democracies in the region in order to counter a rising China. Moreover,
in December 2006, Abe forged the “Strategic and Global Partnership” with India, entailing
cooperation on maritime security, and was supportive of attempts by the Bush administration to
develop quadrilateral security cooperation between Japan, the United States, Australia, and India.
These four countries, along with Singapore, held joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean in
September 2007.
Simultaneously, bilateral security ties between Japan and Australia culminated in the
signing of a Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in March 2007, also
known as a “quasi-alliance.” The joint declaration emphasizes broad cooperation on issues such
as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as more direct military cooperation in
peacekeeping, defense exchanges, search and rescue, and participation in the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI). In June 2007, the two countries established their own “2+2” foreignand defense-ministers’ dialogue, and concluded a “Comprehensive Strategic, Security, and
Economic Partnership” in June the following year. Under the partnership, both countries sought
to build cooperation through strategic information sharing in the Indian Ocean and South China
Sea, PSI, and anti-piracy activities. They have also begun integrating their intelligence and forces
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into U.S. global and regional strategy for missile defense, especially sharing missile launch
detection data.166

Reforming the Institutionalized Yoshida Doctrine
Concomitant with increasing Japan’s military capabilities and security cooperation with
the important partners in the region, the normalist leaders attacked the postwar bureaucratic
regime that had sustained the Yoshida Doctrine. First, Prime Minister Koizumi weakened the
Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB). The CLB, as argued before, had played a central role in
managing the Yoshida Doctrine by providing strict constitutional interpretations, including the
1952 definition of “war potential” and the 1981 ban on collective self-defense, which had
significantly downsized the SDF’s military capabilities and security roles. The problem, from the
normalist perspective, was that CLB officials had worked closely with the LDP mercantilists in
the past to severely constrain the country’s security profile. Therefore, Koizumi sought to exert
more political power over the bureaucratic privilege. Under the new regime, the director general
could no longer answer Diet interpellations on behalf of cabinet ministers—a practice often done
to maintain the CLB’s voice in issues regarding constitutional interpretation. The CLB was
forced to conduct its business on a very short political leash, making it difficult for the institution
to issue more noncongenial interpretations. The same CLB that ruled in 1996 that “it is
problematic to amend the law to enable the prime minister to control and supervise the ministries
and agencies—even during an emergency” came under fuller political control.167
The political reform also targeted the Japan Defense Agency (JDA). Throughout the
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postwar period, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) took overall responsibility for devising
security policy, whereas the JDA was regarded a junior partner in security policymaking.
Lacking full ministerial status, the JDA was incorporated into the Prime Minister’s Office. In an
attempt to keep military officers out of the institution under the principle of civilian control, the
Internal Bureau (naikyoku) of the JDA was overseen by civilian defense counselors (sanjikan).
These civilian assistants were seconded from other ministries, including the MOFA, the Ministry
of Finance, and the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI). The JDA’s administrative
vice-minister and top bureaucrat were generally a MOFA or METI official on secondment.
Overtaken by the opinions of other ministries’ officers with no defense policy experience, the
JDA was unable to exert its own influence in security planning. Some analysts even suggest that
these civilian-control practices have been strict to the point of compromising the basic functions
of the SDF to defend the nation.168
Koizumi and his allies also weakened the councilors in the JDA, which were part of the
current regime that had devalued the institution. JDA Director General Ishiba forcefully argued
that the politicians who understood national security issues should assume control of defense
planning and should no longer depend on the councilors as their proxies. He also elevated the
status of senior military officers in each service branch to the equivalent of the councilors,
allowing military officials to have more influence in the policymaking within the Internal Bureau.
In addition to the tradition of posting junior politicians to each ministry as parliamentary vice
ministers to educate them about policy issues, Koizumi and his followers appointed senior
lawmakers as vice ministers to give politicians even more supervisory influence in
168
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policymaking.
Koizumi’s successor Shinzo Abe (2006-07) continued these reform efforts by promoting
the JDA to the full ministerial level. As a result, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) is now gaining
more ground in security policymaking. The MOD’s new-found confidence in its status was
evinced when, in 2007, Takemasa Moriya, a career ministry official and then-administrative
vice-minister, resisted attempts to impose a secondment from the National Policy Agency (NPA)
as his successor, insisting instead on an internal promotion.169 As seen in the “2+2” dialogues
with the United States and Australia, the MOD now enjoys equal footing with the MOFA in
security negotiations. The MOD also possesses the same budgetary authority as other ministries
so that it no longer needs to go through the cumbersome process of consulting with the Cabinet
Office (naikakuhu) before gaining Prime Minister’s approval when proposing the defense budget.
The same procedure applies to decisions regarding mobilizing the SDF, which will allow for the
swift deployment of the force in times of emergency under the decision of the Defense
Ministry.170

Meeting Public Opposition: The Limits of Normalist Policies
Despite these incremental but tangible steps toward a more robust security policy, the
normalist leaders again met the shoals of public opposition as they had in the 1990s, leaving
much of their agenda unimplemented. Prime Minister Abe, for example, tumbled on the most
controversial topic of constitutional revision—an unavoidable issue when expanding Japan’s
security profile due to its constraints on the nation’s use of force. During his campaign to become
LDP leader and Japanese prime minister, Abe expressed his clear intention to seek constitutional
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revision, and, after winning the election, made this issue a top priority of his agenda. 171
Subsequently, Abe put forward legislation in the Diet to create the formal procedures for the
national referendum required for revising the constitution. Inheriting a two-thirds
“super-majority” in the Lower House from his popular predecessor Koizumi, Abe resorted to a
forceful, partisan stance in passing the legislation in May 2006. The prime minister then moved
to campaign on the issue of constitutional revision in the September 2007 election for the Upper
House.172
However, Abe’s passion for revising the constitution did not resonate well with the
public, who did not view the issue as urgent when problems of economic stagnation and
inequality in Japanese society appeared more pressing. The LDP experienced a historic loss in
the election, losing the majority in the Upper House. Following Abe’s consequent fall from
power, the successive and ephemeral Yasuo Fukuda and Taro Aso administrations (both only
staying in office about one year) did not have the stomach for pursuing controversial
constitutional revision. The debate on revising the constitution soon faded away.
Behind the government’s reluctance was also the fact that the public’s support for
constitutional revision appeared to be declining. According to a 2004 public poll by Yomiuri
Shimbun, support for revising the constitution reached a record high of 65 percent, with only
22.7 percent opposing revision. In spring 2008, however, a narrow majority opposed revision for
171
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the first time since 1993.173 Analysts attribute this change to the public’s alarm surrounding the
perceived rise of nationalistic discourses during the Abe administration. In parallel with the
ideological attitudes of the Abe government, hawkish nationalist intellectuals and commentators
came to occupy Japan’s mass media, with some calling for drastic military expansion and more
autonomous defense, and others even denying the postwar Japanese identity.174 The partisan
manner in which Abe pushed the national referendum law did not help cultivate a broad
consensus among the Japanese people either, who came to understand the issue in a partisan
rather than pragmatic frame. Despite their support for BMD system to address the North Korea’s
missile threat, the public remained alarmed with what appeared to be a “rightward drift” in
Japanese society and rhetoric.
Regarding their country’s nuclearization, the Japanese people also remained cautious.
Against the backdrop of North Korea’s detonation of a small nuclear device in October 2006,
right-leaning politicians, such as former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, Foreign Minister
Taro Aso, and LDP policy chief Shoichi Nakagawa, argued for a debate on the nuclear option.175
However, the antinuclear sentiment among the Japanese public that had endured since 1945 still
remained incredibly potent. A public poll conducted at the time showed that 78 percent of
Japanese citizens opposed nuclear armament, while only 14 percent supported the option.176 In
light of such public opposition, Prime Minister Abe, despite his reputation as a hawk, rejected the
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nuclear option, declaring that Japan would adhere to its non-nuclear principle and would not
further debate this issue within his government. The discussion on nuclear armament remained
closed when his successors, Fukuda and Aso, were in office.
The same negative reaction to militarization was seen during the war on terror. The
Japanese public showed weak support for SDF participation in the Afghanistan war although the
deployment was mainly a logistical, noncombat mission in support of the U.S.-led military action.
A public poll taken in November 2001 showed 44 percent showed support for and 48 percent
expressed opposition to the SDF mission in the Indian Ocean. 177 The dispatch of Aegis
destroyers to the mission, because it implicated military involvement, also proved unpopular and
contentious among the public and even within the ruling LDP-led coalition. Consequently, the
Koizumi government was not able to justify the deployment on military grounds but to claim that
the dispatch was a way to enhance the amenities available for SDF sailors. 178 Moreover, when
the antiterrorist special legislation needed a renewal for continuing the mission in fall 2007, the
LDP government, due to opposition from the public and the DPJ, had to defend the renewal as
providing noncombat support for a U.N.-centered mission designed to interdict weapons and
drugs and maintain maritime security rather than directly linking it to the war on terror or the war
in Afghanistan.179
The Iraq War also encountered public opposition against military involvement. After
dispatching the SDF for humanitarian efforts in Iraq, Koizumi sought to provide a more military
contribution by providing a novel constitutional interpretation. In his press conference
announcing Japan’s participation in the Iraq war on December 9, 2003, he suggested that more
177
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important than the war-renouncing Article 9 was the preamble of the constitution, which
obligates Japan to contribute to the realization of high ideals in the world, such as the banishment
of tyranny and oppression and promotion of international peace. Koizumi cited sections of the
constitution: “We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone… We, the Japanese people,
pledge our national honors to accomplish these high ideals and purposes with all our resources.”
He then concluded, “Indeed, I believe the international community is calling upon Japan, and the
people of Japan to act in accordance with the ideals of our Constitution.”180 By arguing such an
interpretation, Koizumi appeared to be trying to persuade public opinion to accept broader
missions for the SDF beyond humanitarian and reconstruction operations.
However, his ambition to upgrade Japanese security profile did not resonate well with
the public, who remained dissatisfied with Koizumi’s explanation. The public poll following the
press conference found 63 percent of respondents expressing dissatisfaction with Koizumi’s
justification of Japan’s participation in the Iraq war, as opposed to only 23 percent showing
satisfaction. Another poll demonstrated that the approval rating for the prime minister declined
from 47 percent to 41 percent after the speech. This trend continued for weeks after the press
conference, as 85.7 percent believed the prime minister had not provided adequate explanation
for the SDF deployment, versus only 10.7 percent who viewed his explanation adequate. 181
Facing these dismal public polls, Koizumi and other members of his cabinet stopped advancing
their hawkish arguments for expanding the SDF’s security missions in Iraq. Instead of suggesting
that Japan had an obligation to send military forces overseas to overthrow tyranny and promote
peace, the Japanese government justified the Iraq deployment as a purely humanitarian and
reconstruction operation, as it did for the Cambodian UN PKO mission ten years earlier.
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Japan’s participation in the war on terror was certainly a historic event considering the
nation’s longstanding low-key security profile. Japan’s participation, however, remained a
logistical supporting role in the Indian Ocean and essentially noncombatant and humanitarian in
Iraq. In enhancing security in and assisting with the reconstruction of Afghanistan, the
government sent financial assistance instead of its armed force, and was in fact the
second-largest investor in the country between 2001 and 2011. 182 The war on terror was
definitely a step toward Japan’s expanding security role as a “normal nation,” but the approach
itself chiefly maintained more of a civilian, rather than military, one that a “global civilian power”
would find appropriate.
The recent normalization process has also suffered from financial constraints on
Japanese defense spending. Defense expenditure has in fact kept within the GNP 1 percent limit
already officially abandoned by former Prime Minister Nakasone in the late 1980s. It even
consistently declined for ten consecutive years since 2002. Japanese military capabilities have
been indeed strengthened in quality with the recent procurements. However, these financial
constrains have significantly limited the caliber of remilitarization.
Consequently, despite the emerging normalization of its security policy, Japan has not
yet reasserted itself as a normal great military power. While assuming a larger international
security role and strengthening its defense force to confront regional security challenges, it still
remains hesitant to pursue a drastic course of militarization or use its newly acquired military
might for the pursuit of its national interest. Rather, Japan prefers a civilian approach to
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international security instead of the use of force, unlike other great powers such as France or
Great Britain that routinely send forces on combat missions across the globe. Japan’s identity
therefore remains to be somewhere in between, or a mosaic, of a “normal nation” and “global
civilian power.” The Yoshida Doctrine, which has significantly deemphasized Japan’s use of
force for more than a half century, was not entirely replaced but rather was restructured and thus
endured in the twenty-first century.

After the 2009 Election: A New Party in Power, a New Identity for Japan?
The arrival of Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio and the DPJ in office after the 2009
election raised interesting questions about how a non-LDP administration would settle existing
alternative identities for Japan. The DPJ, which has a more internationalist bent than the LDP,
put a greater emphasis on the UN and multilateralism and the relations with an emergent East
Asian regional community, and therefore possessed a potential penchant for the global civilian
power vision. However, before reversing the trend toward normalization, the DPJ political
foundation rapidly collapsed while facing a series of international and domestic challenges. The
DPJ administration eventually came close to embracing the LDP’s normalist foreign policy
agenda. This suggests that there seems to be an emerging national consensus on Japan’s identity
as a “normal nation,” though this “normalcy” still does not equate to great military power status.
The DPJ came into office with a vision of Japan’s grand strategy significantly different
from the LDP’s, with their stronger focus on achieving the East Asian Community (EAC) and a
more symmetrical balance of power (seisankakkeiron) among Japan, the United States, and
China. The DPJ leaders have argued that the LDP has been overly simplistic in asserting that as
long as U.S.-Japan relations were healthy, then positive East Asia-Japan relations would follow.
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According to the DJP, Japan has been “too dependent on the United States” (Beikoku ni izon
shisugita) and needed to form a more Asia-focused policy and a more symmetric
U.S.-China-Japan triangle.183 Therefore, they argued that East Asian regionalism should serve as
the bedrock of Japan’s grand strategy and that the EAC should be the prime vehicle for
establishing greater regional institutionalization. The purpose is not either to counterbalance or to
contain China; rather it is to enmesh China (Chugoku o koritsu sasezu, Ajia nonaka ni makikomi)
within a more effective macroregional framework in order to provide the necessary collective
leverage among East Asian states to actively engage against any shift toward Chinese unipolarity.
Put differently, the DPJ has embraced the emerging multipolarity in East Asia and has attempted
to maintain friendly relations under one regional framework. As a result, the DPJ has been
reluctant to follow the LDP’s course of depending on and cooperating with the United States to
maintain U.S. unipolarity and counterbalance against rising China.184
However, their foreign policy strategy fell into a quagmire after a series of diplomatic
disasters, which led the new party in power to reconsider its policymaking and ultimately to
follow the LDP’s normalist security policy agendas. The first diplomatic disaster was the
mishandling of the U.S. base issue in Okinawa. While implementing the 2009 campaign
manifesto of removing the U.S. military bases from the islands, the Hatoyama government
attempted to reverse the 2006 Road Map, in which the previous LDP administrations managed to
forge an agreement with local and U.S. governments for relocating the Futenma base from the
densely populated area to Henoko, a less populated area in the north.185
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However, Hatoyama’s abrupt move understandably aroused the Obama administration’s
concerns about Japanese intentions. This was further compounded with the seemingly poor
communication with the new DJP government via spokesmen, divisions between the State and
Defense departments over how to respond, and then Defense Secretary Robert Gate’s outright
rejection of renegotiation during his trip to Japan in October 2009. It was, as one analyst has
called, a “mini-crisis in U.S.-Japan relations.”186
In the midst of such a diplomatic crisis, Hatoyama had nowhere to go, without a vision
of where else to relocate the Futenma base and sufficient consultation with the local populations
on alternative sites. He then slowly moved to reverse his stance on the issue and to accept the
2006 agreement, but only to find himself in the fierce public uproar and consequent calls for
resignation even from his own party. Before realizing his foreign policy objectives, the new
prime minister resigned in June 2010, only months after the historic landslide election that
eliminated the LDP from power for only the second time since 1955.
Hatoyama’s successor Naoto Kan also faced a diplomatic obstacle: the Senkaku Islands
territorial dispute. In September 2010, Japanese officials arrested a Chinese captain whose
fishing boat collided with two Japanese Coast Guard patrol ships near the islands. This
detainment evoked a number of vociferous actions from China: a call for the captain’s release,
accusations against Japan of endangering the safety of Chinese fishermen and fishing boats in
waters near China’s territory, and a deployment of Chinese patrol ships near the islands. The
Chinese government maintained its retaliatory response even after Japanese officials released the
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captain, demanding Japan’s apology and compensation, allowing anti-Japan protests and
continuing deployment of patrol ships and military assets near the islands in the following
months. In response, President Barack Obama, State Secretary Hilary Clinton, and Defense
Secretary, one after another, declared that the Senkakus are covered by the U.S.-Japan security
treaty, promising that the United States would side with Japan in times of emergency. The
Senkaku issue was emerging as a tangible security concern and testament of Chinese
assertiveness in the region, threatening the optimistic prospect of establishing the East Asian
Community while testifying the importance of U.S. security guarantee in the region. The DPJ
government now needed to rethink its security policy and alliance with the United States.
The DPJ government ultimately chose a more robust defense posture and security
cooperation with the United States—de facto continuation of the LDP’s normalist policy. The
2010 National Defense Program Guidelines abandoned the longstanding “Basic Defense Force
Concept” and adopted a new concept of “Dynamic Defense Force.” The new concept calls for
the SDF’s enhanced readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability and versatility, reinforced by
advanced technology and intelligence capabilities. The goal of the new force structure is to
become able to deter and repel small-scale opportunistic or fait accompli expansion with an
immediate and seamless response.187
Clearly, the scenario in mind was expulsion of Chinese intrusion into the Senkakus. In
fact, the 2010 NDPG mandated “the SDF will permanently station the minimum necessary units
on off-shore islands where the SDF is not currently stationed” and secure “bases, mobility,
transport capacity and effective countermeasures necessary for conducting operations against…
187
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attacks [on these islands].” The NDPG called for deployment of a GSDF force of 1,000 troops as
a “coastal monitoring” unit on Yonaguni, the closest inhabited Japanese island to the Senkakus.
The DPJ also promoted the establishment of an amphibious-assault unit (similar to the U.S.
Marine Corps in function) in the GSDF, as a means to boost the defense of the southern islands.
Meanwhile, the SDF has been increasingly engaging in military exercises designed to address
any future amphibious attacks on offshore islands on Kyushu and Okinawa for responding to
amphibious attacks on offshore islands. It also has conducted similar training exercises with U.S.
troops in the wake of the August 2012 Chinese activists landing on the Senkakus and the
following repeated intrusions by Chinese vessels into Japanese territorial waters near the islands.
In the 2011 “2+2” ministerial meeting with the United States, the Japanese government
essentially promised to maintain the 2006 Road Map, while at the same time pledged to
cooperate with its ally in maintaining regional order, with its newly structured Dynamic Defense
Force. The joint declaration listed areas of cooperation including missile defense and protection
of the freedom of navigation and safe and secure sea lines of communication, which implicitly
referred to the Chinese increasing ballistic missile capabilities and assertive behavior in both the
South and East China Seas. The list also included intelligence operations and cyberspace, among
other things, and spoke of a U.S.-Japan Space Security Dialogue following the 2008 lifting of the
ban on use of space for military purposes.
Moreover, following the joint declaration, the Japanese government moved to relax its
longstanding ban on the export of weapons and military equipment. This move would provide
the country with opportunities to participate in multinational development projects on everything
from missile defense systems to fighter jets. It opens international market for Japanese defense
corporations, which is expected to reduce the costs of procurement for the SDF. The ban would
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also allow the country to export military equipment for peacekeeping missions and international
cooperation such as UN PKO. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Kan’s successor, Yoshihiko Noda,
even showed his willingness to exercise the right of collective-defense, stating “We want to make
detailed discussions (on a review of the interpretation) within the government” in a Diet
session.188 Clearly, the opposition DPJ had moved to come to terms with the normalist agendas
of the previous LDP administrations.
However, none of this is to say that the penchant for a more civilian approach has
vanished. Having consistently opposed U.S. use of force overseas during the 2000s, the
Hatoyama administration terminated the SDF refueling mission in the Indian Ocean. Instead, the
DPJ put together a $5 billion package over five years for civilian support for Afghan
reconstruction programs including police training, employment of former combatants, and
development of agriculture and energy. In line with this civilian approach, the DPJ government
dispatched the SDF to Haiti for a humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) and
reconstruction mission, following the 2010 devastating earthquake in the country. The DPJ later
approved a SDF deployment to South Sudan for a noncombat reconstruction mission in the
aftermath of the state’s long-awaited independence. As it has been a strong proponent of overseas
deployments of the SDF for UN centric non-combat HADR and reconstruction, the DPJ
willingly approved these operations, keeping its civilian power stance. The Japanese public was
also in favor of their country’s civilian posture. A 2012 public poll by Cabinet Office
demonstrated an overwhelming majority of 87.4 percent expressed their support for SDF
peacekeeping missions. 189 In its use of force for international security, Japan has still retained its
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civilian posture, despite the emerging wave of normalization. It is therefore this combination, or
a mosaic, of normalist and internationalist identities that characterizes Japan’s current identity.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I described Japan’s identity construction and security policy during the
Cold War and post-Cold War periods. Specifically, I argued that the country has undergone two
identity crises, each in the aftermath of the Second World War and the Cold War. In the first
identity crisis, the mercantilist camp emerged as a hegemonic identity, incorporated the pacifist
principles into its foreign policy, and presented the state as a “merchant nation” and a “peace
nation” under the Yoshida Doctrine, a grand strategy comprising both mercantilism and pacifism.
This doctrine (1) prioritized economic development, (2) minimized the state’s defense spending
and international security role and (3) led the state to rely on the U.S. for its security. The
doctrine ultimately set Japan on a path to becoming a peaceful economic power rather than a
great military power.
The second identity crisis occurred in the aftermath of the Cold War, which presented
new security challenges to Japan such as the Gulf War, North Korean missile and nuclear
programs, China’s military expansion, and the war on terror. In this second identity crisis, the
normalist camp has emerged as a new hegemonic identity, incorporating elements of the
internationalist perspectives in a subordinate fashion. This new dynamic of contestation shifted
Japan’s identity to one characterized as a “normal nation” that has a greater international security
role and military capabilities, but also as a “global civilian power” that emphasizes its use of
forces for humanitarian noncombat missions in promoting the world’s peace and security rather
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than for an aggressive pursuit of its national interests. Therefore, the new security policy is more
nuanced than pure militant realism, and the new national identity less drastic than a muscular,
“normal” Japan defined by realists.
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Policy Implications
In this chapter, I attempt to explore policy implications of the findings established in the
earlier chapters. I have depicted the recent transformation of Japanese security policy as a result
of the internal contestation between two identity groups—normalist and internationalist—and its
consequent “mosaic” nature of Japan’s new identity consisting of two different part-identities.
This mosaic picture presents us long-term implications for Tokyo’s evolving security strategy.
First, Japan will gradually eliminate the constraints on, and enhance the capabilities of,
its military force for fully conducting operations related to homeland defense. Despite its
constitutional and other legal constraints, Japan has proceeded to procure a BMD system in
response to the perceived threats of North Korean and Chinese ballistic missile programs while
moving to accept space activities for military purposes. As we have seen in the previous chapter,
these moves for building a more robust military posture, despite its controversial nature, have
gained considerable support among both Japanese policymakers and public. In addition, the
legislation enabling these procurements have mustered votes from parties across the aisle, and
the vast majority of the public has showed their support every time the BMD system was
deployed in anticipation of North Korean missile launches.
Among these domestic developments in homeland defense, the Senkaku Islands
territorial dispute is arguably the most highlighted and time-sensitive case in point. This
longstanding issue between China and Japan has nearly scaled up to nearly the point of a
potential armed conflict since the Chinese intrusion into, and the Japanese nationalization of,
these islands in the summer of 2012. Since then, there have been a number of Chinese intrusions
into Japan’s territorial waters and even territorial airspace. Once, Chinese and Japanese fighter
jets came to the scene when the Chinese government sent a civilian surveillance plane near the
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disputed islands.190 In response, Japan’s security ally, the United States, has demonstrated its
commitment to guarding the islands if they come under attack by Chinese military force.
However, such reassurance of the American deterrence guarantee cannot completely assuage the
fears of Japanese policymakers, when it is conceivable that U.S. policymakers would not
willingly take a course of entrapment by committing to such a futile military fight over the small
rocks in the vast East China Sea, instead expecting Japan to take necessary steps to defend its
own territory.
In response to such concerns, the Japanese government has been taking steps to bolster
its defense on the southeast, including increased military exercises for territorial defense and the
recent purchase of four AAV-7s (amphibious assault vehicle).191 The procurement of AAVs
signals Japanese increased concerns for and commitments to defending its territory, as the
offensive-oriented nature of the crafts may violate the longstanding principle of exclusively
defense-oriented policy of the SDF. In January of this year, the Japanese Defense Ministry even
announced its plan to strengthen its security over the Senkaku Islands by deploying U.S. Global
Hawk unmanned drones over its territory in the East China Sea.192
And the Japanese public appears to be supportive of these moves toward a more robust
defense posture. The January 2012 public poll by Cabinet Office shows that a vast majority of
71.5 percent (a big increase from 60.1 percent in 2011) selecting “national defense” as an area
where the SDF should put more focus. Behind this perception lie concerns about the Chinese
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military.193 The latest public poll conducted by The Genron NPO and the China Daily in June
2012 shows that 58.7 percent of the Japanese pubic regarded China as a military threat, the
highest number since the poll was begun in 2005.194 This increased commitment to homeland
defense, or a more “normal” security posture, seems to be a continuing trend as long as the
security concerns surrounding China endure.
Second, as a result of the first trend, Japan will incrementally reduce its dependence on
the United States in many areas as the SDF becomes more capable in traditional national defense
operations. Postwar Japanese security policy, at least until the end of the Cold War, had been
marked by its total dependence on the American deterrence guarantee. Jennifer Lind has argued
this security strategy adheres to defense realism’s “buck-passing” strategy, a balancing act
against a threat mainly through relying on the efforts of others rather than its own.195 The recent
transformation of Japanese security policy then exemplifies a move toward more of buck-sharing
in the bilateral security arrangement, at least as far as homeland defense is concerned. By
acquiring more advanced military capabilities and removing constrain on the use of force, Japan
is stepping toward shouldering its own share of responsibility in defending its territory.
However, none of this suggests that Tokyo is now abandoning the American security
guarantee and seeking to establish military independence or autonomous defense. Such calls for
autonomous defense do exist among the right-wing nationalists in the normalist camp, such as
Shintaro Ishihara, who would like to see Japan extricate itself from its dependence on U.S. forces
and establish an autonomous defense posture even through nuclearization. However, as seen in
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the previous chapters, such nationalistic demands have not gained any significant support from
the Japanese people but rather warned them against the “rightward drift” in Japanese society, or
such a radical representation of Japan as “a normal nation.” Japan’s intention is rather modest;
the country is just struggling to assume a more “equal” responsibility in the bilateral security
alliance.
Third, Japan is very unlikely to agree to make certain military contributions, such as
participation in joint combat operations or stand-alone security and stabilization missions with
U.S.-led or U.N.-led coalition forces, in theaters such as Afghanistan or Iraq that are distant and
involve missions not directly linked to Japan’s territorial defense. As in the case of the war on
terror, the Japanese people still have little tolerance for their forces participating in military
missions abroad, especially in armed conflict that does not, in their view, threaten national
security. When the country commits itself to such overseas war efforts, it will very likely remain
a supplementary, logistical role that does not involve combat operations. But even such
nonmilitary missions are not welcomed by the Japanese people as in the case of the refueling
mission in the Indian Ocean.
Rather, the public would like to see their forces contributing to international peace and
security in a civilian fashion such as humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, and disaster relief
missions, or their country providing financial assistance for these humanitarian efforts. And this
civilian approach is what Tokyo has adopted since the end of the Cold War: participation in U.N.
PKO noncombat operations, the humanitarian mission in Iraq, and the five billion dollars ODA
package for Afghanistan reconstruction. Despite the emerging wave of normalization of its
security policy, Japan has remained “a global civilian power” in promoting international peace
and security.
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Lastly, these three trends suggest that Japan is neither boosting up its security posture
for a great power ambition nor becoming a normal great military power. The military buildup in
response to the new security challenges, such as China’s rapid militarization and assertive
behavior in its surrounding seas and North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, remains to be
purely defensive in its intention. The Japanese government does not aspire to great power status
in its recent military efforts, or to pursuit of its national interests through using its newly acquired
military capabilities. To call the new nation’s military posture “a normal military power,”196 as
realists might, is also misleading as the country is still inhibited in the use of force, unlike other
military powers such as Great Britain and France that routinely send military forces for combat
missions across the globe.
This enlightened portrait of Japan’s new “normal” security policy also reveals a striking
continuation of the Yoshida Doctrine. Yet, the recent transformation of security policy has indeed
led many analysts to question the relevancy of the doctrine today, including Kenneth Pyle, who
has declared it “a dead letter.”197 This characterization, however, is misleading. Despite the
nationalist demands for autonomous defense from the right-wing fringe of society, the country
has remained content with the U.S. military presence in the region as the status-quo power and
stabilizer, and has moved to maintain the U.S. military superiority by assuming more
responsibility in the bilateral arrangement. As Yoshihide Soeya describes, Japan has remained,
and continues to be, a “middle power” that is closely bounded by U.S. military strategy, and
whose role remains a supplementary one to that strategy, rather than playing an independent
one.198 Moreover, this supplemental role emphasizes nonmilitary, logistic missions as in the case
of the refueling operation in the Indian Ocean, or humanitarian ones as in the case of U.N. PKO
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operations. Japan’s military role continues to be as deemphasized as it has traditionally been
under the Yoshida strategy during the Cold War. The Yoshida Doctrine is not entirely displaced
but updated to the new security environment while reflecting the new articulation of the
country’s identity.
Whether all these trends continue for decades to come of course remains to be seen, as
the former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, a forthright normalist, has regained power. Determined to
implement the unfinished agenda during his last term, he has already promised to resume the
process of constitutional revision to establish a “national defense military” (kokubogun) and
recognize the right of collective self-defense. He has also proposed to increase defense
expenditure for the coming fiscal year of 2013, which has been contracting for ten consecutive
years since 2002. The Japanese public seems to be showing support for increasing the country’s
defense capabilities. The recent poll in Yomiuri Shimbun conducted in the mid-January 2013
shows 54 percent expressing support, versus 36 percent expressing opposition. 199 The new
prime minister has also demonstrated his commitment to strengthen the U.S.-Japan security
cooperation by playing a more active role in light of the intensifying security concerns over
China and North Korea.
None of this, however, has seemed to suggest a drastic derailment from the
aforementioned trends. Japan will likely continue its normalization process by beefing up its
security posture in homeland defense and in the U.S. security alliance, but still only commit itself
to nonmilitary and civilian missions when called upon to contribute to international peace and
security. At least it is safe to confidently affirm that Japan is not becoming a great power with
full-blown rearmament including nuclear capabilities and using its force overseas in pursuing its
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national interests, as some neorealists have predicted.200
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Theoretical Implications
In the previous chapters, I have illustrated that the making of Japanese security policy
was a product of the internal contestation among identity groups, or part-identities, which have
different visions of national interest and identity in forming Japan’s identity as a whole, or
whole-identity. Through the contestation, a dominant, or hegemonic, identity group emerges and
incorporates perspectives of other subordinate groups, constructing the whole-identity that can be
best described as a “mosaic” of multiple discourses. This model of identity construction presents
us a number of serious theoretical implications for the field of IR.
First, a state cannot be treated as a unitary actor with a pre-given set of interests or as a
black-box that conducts its foreign policy independent of its internal political dynamics. The
materialist schools of IR theory, such realism and liberalism, have depicted state actors unitary,
calculating actors who seek to maximize their interests following the logic of military or
economic expediency. This rationalist approach assumes interests are exogenous to (i.e., prior to
or separate from) social interaction and therefore states have a pre-existing set of interests. State
behavior is then just a rational response to the material conditions of the external environment.
For rationalists, what happens within states is insignificant: States are reduced to a mere
black-box. Ignoring the domestic context explains why the rationalists, especially realists, have
confronted the two puzzles regarding Japanese security policy: (1) the postwar minimalist
security posture despite its economic might and (2) the recent normalization of that posture that
still deviates from the realist prediction of becoming a great military power.
However, as I have illustrated in the earlier chapters, the development and
implementation of Japan’s security policy has been deeply grounded in its domestic political
dynamics, i.e. the internal contestation among the competing identity groups. Japan has indeed
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been responding to the material conditions of the external environment, but this response was
mediated through the internal context in which the domestic actors constantly construct social
meanings out of the international (and national) events and propose new visions of national
interest and identity based on those meanings. As Keiko Hirata writes:
A state’s foreign policy is shaped by the international environment and the domestic
political context in which political actors interpret national and international events,
compete with each other, and make their views prevail. The development and
implementation of security policy in Japan, as elsewhere, involves competing
interpretations of state identity and political conflict among the actors who promote
these differing interpretations.201
It is this complex foreign-domestic interaction that determines Japan’s foreign policy. Therefore,
without moving beyond the black-box rhetoric and accounting for these dynamics at work, one
can hardly explain Japan’s (or, for that matter, any states’) foreign and security policy.
Second, the negation of the black-box rhetoric raises the importance of ideas in
international politics. The rationalist school of IR theory pays attention to only material factors
such as distribution of military and economic power as the basis of its analysis of state behavior.
It is true that the realist prediction of Japan’s more assertive security policy does seem to align
with the current trajectory of the “normalization” process. Irrespective of the role of ideas in
international politics, Japan (or any state for that matter) may follow the supposed-to-be “rational”
course of realist security policy. To this extent, certain material forces (e.g. North Korea’s
existential missile threat, especially combined with the nuclear program) appear to have
independent effects on state behavior (e.g. Japan’s controversial development and deployment of
a BMD system).202 However, this argument does not deny the fact that domestic political actors
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construct social meanings about national interest and identity out of material conditions, and
form foreign policy based on those meanings: whether Japan should become “a normal nation”
by claiming greater defense capabilities and a more assertive security posture. In other words,
material interests are meaning-laden and can be interpreted in a variety of ways and produce
different policy effects depending on the interpretation. Therefore, ideas matter as much as
material reality does in determining state behavior.
Also, disregarding the role of ideas in its analysis, one can hardly account for the
meanings and intentions behind states’ actions, which can differ even when these actions take
similar forms. This point is especially important when one can misconstrue Japan’s intention
behind its more assertive security policy as the realist prediction of a great military power
ambition, while the intention is more benign to become just “a normal nation,” and this normalcy
is even less militaristic due to its mosaic aspect that incorporates the “global civilian power”
approach.
Third, the state identity construction process via contestation among competing identity
groups serves as a causal mechanism between the changes in the international security
environment (exogenous shocks) and the identity shift (endogenous change). As seen above, the
internal contestation is always subject to changes in the state’s interactions with other states and
position in the international system as the domestic actors are discussing the vision of the state
that would be appropriate in this international context. If the international context changes, the
domestic actors will propose alternative accounts of national interest and identity as responses to
such changes. This new dynamics in the contestation then leads to a new articulation of identity,
or an identity shift. Put differently, changes in the external balance of power among states
(material change) influence the internal dynamics and balance of power among competing
Social Theory, 109-13, 130-5, emphasis in original.
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identity groups which read such material conditions through their different ideational frames, and
produce a new identity (ideational change), and vice versa. This is why the domestic actors in
Japan have proposed new visions for the country—a “normal nation” and a “global civilian
power”—in addressing the new security environment of the post-Cold War order, and
consequently constructed a new state identity that incorporates principles of both visions. This
internal change, in turn, changes Japan’s position and the balance of power in the international
system. In sum, the contestation process serves as a mediator between exogenous changes in the
international system and endogenous transformations of the intrastate identity variable.
It is important to note that this perspective is rendered possible because of the holistic
constructivist approach that I have adopted in my identity construction model. The existing
constructivist accounts of Japanese security policy such as Thomas Berger’s and Peter
Katzenstein’s have taken the form of unit-level constructivism and only focused on the internal
political dynamics that have created what they call a “culture of antimilitarism.” According to
their account, this culture of antimilitarism has contributed to Japan’s minimalist military posture
despite its economic prowess, or its antimilitarist identity. Katzenstein goes further by saying
“Japan’s security policy will continue to be shaped by the domestic rather than the international
balance of power.”203 While he correctly pays attention to the domestic political dynamics in
arguing for the influences of internal cultural norms on foreign policy decisions, Katzenstein
seems to underestimate the evidence that the domestic context is shaped by the international
systemic factors. As seen in the earlier chapters, it is precisely because of the lack of attention to
the systemic level that prevents the existing constructivist accounts from treating identity as a
relational and therefore a fluid entity that constantly interacts with others and renew itself as the
social context changes. As a result, Berger’s and Katzentein’s work does not seem to reflect the
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recent “normalization” of Japanese security policy based on changes in the state identity. The
model presented in this study overcomes such a setback in the existing account by taking the
form of holistic constructivism and presents the internal contestation process as a causal
mechanism between the changes in the international security environment (exogenous shocks)
and the identity shift (endogenous change).
Last but not least, the “mosaic” picture of identity presented by this model complicates a
dominant assumption in all paradigms of IR, namely, that state actors are monolithic entities with
coherent sets of interests. I have illustrated that how, in the dynamics of internal contestation, a
hegemonic identity group emerges and incorporate perspectives of other groups in a subordinate
fashion in constructing the whole-identity that can be best described as a mosaic of multiple
discourses. As we have seen in the earlier chapters, Japan’s identity has accommodated multiple
identity groups’ discourses despite their different visions of national interest and identity: the
mercantilist and the pacifist discourses during the Cold War and the normalist and
internationalist discourses after the Cold War. It is this mosaic nature of identity that has allowed
me to adequately account for a Japanese security policy that cannot be explained by a one
identity vision, i.e. the mercantilist Yoshida strategy that incorporated pacifism in maintaining
the minimalist armed forces and security role, and the recent normal security policy that, despite
its strengthening of military capabilities and international security role, still adheres to a civilian
approach in assuming that role and does not use forces to pursue its own interests. Moreover, if
we think about the quotidian reality of politics, the mosaic metaphor should not be so surprising.
Just as we make adjustments and compromises to come to an agreement in any political
processes when our interests and proposals conflict one another, so do we when coming to a
consensus on what the interest and identity of our nation should be.
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And yet, this more enlightened (and perhaps commonsensical) portrait of state identity
does not seem to be so prevalent in the field of IR theory that presupposes state actors as
monolithic entities with coherent sets of interests. It goes without saying that rationalists trap
themselves in such a unitary actor assumption as they leave states as a black-box. This
misleading assumption, however, is not only unique to the rationalist but is widespread in
ideationalist or constructivist accounts. Following the “third-image” perspective of neorealism,
systemic constructivism, on the one hand, focuses solely on interactions between “imaginary”
unitary state actors. Ignoring what happens within the domestic political realm, it explains world
politics simply by theorizing how states socialize one another in the external, international
domain. According to the systemic accounts, there is a social structure to international politics,
constituted by norms, ideas, and meanings that have “intersubjective” qualities. States acquire
identities through such intersubjectivities that are constituted by the social structure of
international politics. 204 Therefore, little attention is paid to the intrastate arena, where
contestation among competing visions of national interest and identity produces the mosaic
nature of state identity; states are treated as monolithic actors.
On the other hand, unit-level constructivism does investigate the intrastate process of
identity construction by concentrating on the relationship between domestic social and legal
norms and the identities and interests of states. It is problematic, however, that this form of
constructivism attempts to account for the sources of state identity by attributing to one
overarching socially dominant norm, e.g. Berger’s and Katzenstein’s accounts of the “culture of
antimilitarism” in Japanese case. This move has somewhat homogenizing effects in that their
characterization of the cultural norm represents Japan’s identity solely based on that norm, rather
than the aggregate of the alternative visions of multiple identity groups. However, as seen in the
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earlier chapters, it was the combination of mercantilist and pacifist norms that had comprised
Japan’s postwar identity during the Cold War. This is why its identity was a mosaic of “merchant
nation” and “peace nation.”
Accordingly, to fully appreciate the mosaic nature of state identity, one needs to start
questioning the dominant assumption in all paradigms of IR that state actors are monolithic
entities with coherent sets of interests. This move may result in a less parsimonious and elegant
account of state behavior than the existing IR theory. And yet, it has the merit of a more
exhaustive analysis of identity construction that can help us explain what may appear as residual
behavior based on the monolithic picture of identity.
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Conclusion
In this thesis, I have addressed two puzzles regarding the state’s security policy: (1)
Japan’s minimalist military posture despite its economic power during the Cold War and (2) the
recent shift from this minimalist security policy to an assertive one marked by a strengthening of
its international security role and military. I have argued that although many IR scholars, mainly
from the realist camp, claim that the formation of the original security policy (puzzle 1) and its
following transformation (puzzle 2) is driven by the state’s rational response to external
conditions of the international security environment, it can more adequately be explained by the
complex dynamics of internal contestation among identity groups with different visions of
Japan’s identity and interest. The culmination of this contestation process is what I call an
“identity crisis,” in which a new dominant, or hegemonic, identity group emerges and
incorporates perspectives of other subordinate groups, constructing the state identity as a
“mosaic” of multiple discourses.
I have illustrated that the first identity crisis happened in the aftermath of the World War
II, in which there were three competing part-identities—pacifist, mercantilist, and revisionist.
The outcome of this contestation was that the mercantilist camp emerged as a hegemonic identity,
incorporated the pacifist principles into its foreign policy, and presented the state as a “merchant
nation” and a “peace nation” under the Yoshida Doctrine, a grand strategy comprising both
mercantilism and pacifism. This doctrine (1) prioritized economic development, (2) minimized
the state’s defense spending and international security role and (3) led the state to rely on the U.S.
for its security. The doctrine ultimately set Japan on a path to becoming a peaceful economic
power rather than a great military power.
However, the new security challenges that emerged after the end of the Cold War
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convinced the domestic political actors that the existing state identity was no longer sustainable.
The extant mercantilist identity evolved into a new part-identity, internationalist, and another
new part-identity, normalist, emerged in the place of the revisionist one, while the pacifist
identity group faded away from the political forefront. Consequently, Japan is currently
undergoing a second identity crisis, in which the normalist camp has emerged as a new
hegemonic identity while incorporating elements of the internationalist perspectives in a
subordinate fashion. This new dynamic of contestation shifted Japan’s whole-identity to one
characterized as a “normal nation” that has a greater international security role and military
capabilities, but also as a “global civilian power” that emphasizes its use of force for
humanitarian noncombat missions in promoting the world’s peace and security rather than for an
aggressive pursuit of its national interests. Therefore, the new security policy is more nuanced
than pure militant realism, and the new national identity less militaristic than a muscular,
“normal” Japan defined by realists.
The model of identity construction which I have laid out in this thesis is applicable not
only to Japan but also to any other countries as their domestic actors have competing views of
national identity and interest. In fact, there are similar accounts of identity formation in the IR
literature, though it does not necessarily use the language of constructivist theory. For instance,
many scholars have identified in the U.S. identity discourse what they call an “identity
dichotomy” consisting of “exemplary” exceptionalism (an isolationist posture exemplified by
Puritan John Winthrop’s “City upon a Hill” speech and George Washington’s warning against
“permanent alliances” in his farewell address of 1796) and “missionary” exceptionalism (an
internationalist posture exemplified by Woodrow Wilson’s mission to make the world safe for
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democracy).205 Some of these scholars have described that American foreign policy is cyclical,
i.e. swinging like a pendulum between isolationism and internationalism.206 Others have argued
that isolationism dominated the early years of U.S. foreign policy, whereas internationalism
conclusively won after the country entered into the Second World War.207 While which argument
offers more convincing accounts is not a matter to be discussed in this thesis, these past studies
suggest the applicability of my model to countries other than Japan. Therefore, by applying my
model to other case studies, we might be able to achieve more interesting, exhaustive, and
complex understanding of world politics and potentially expand the boundaries of the existing IR
theories.
My model, however, is by no means a conclusive answer to how we should
conceptualize and analyze identity as a variable. It rather problematizes the ways in which we
think of the concept and proposes areas in which future research is needed. For instance,
constructivists have introduced identity as an alternative to, or the basis of, interests that are
hitherto assumed as given and fixed. And yet, the fluid aspect of identity highlighted in my
model demonstrates that we need to treat identity not only as an independent variable to interests
(a dependent variable), but also as a dependent variable subjected to changes in external
conditions of the international system (an independent variable). This dual aspect of identity as a
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variable demonstrates the true meaning of the constructivist intervention in IR theory, namely,
that structure and agency are “mutually constructed,” warning us against treating identity as
given and requiring us to pay close attention to the identity construction process.
The fluidity of identity also raises the importance of the concept’s relational aspect,
which needs further examination. I have illustrated that identity is relational in that domestic
actors constantly form competing visions of national identity based upon their different
interpretations of the country’s changing relationship to other states. This relationality in a
self/other, systemic sense, I have demonstrated, leads to the fluidity of identity. Meanwhile, my
empirical analysis seems to suggest that identity is also relational in a historical sense. That is to
say, domestic actors construct their visions of national identity partly based on their different
readings of the country’s history. Put differently, these visions are re-articulations of a self that
are based on the different interpretations of the past self and that are projected onto the future
(i.e., what the self should become in the future). For instance, during the Cold War, Japanese
domestic actors formed the pacifist and mercantilist visions by reflecting on the devastating
consequence of Japan’s prewar militarism. The collective memory of Japan’s past may be fading
away as time passes and generational changes happen. However, it is still possible that domestic
actors reflect on the current militaristic normalization in terms of the past tragedy, as efforts to
preserve the war memory continue today. Furthermore, neighboring states in Asia can also
prompt this remembrance of history. For instance, China and South Korea accuse Japan of not
truthfully facing its past aggression when Japanese politicians make controversial visits to the
Yasukuni Shrine, where war criminals of World War II are honored. Such replays of the records
of history could have a significant impact on the ways in which Japanese domestic actors seek to
redefine their country’s national identity. This point also raises the role of recognition in identity
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formation at the systemic level; whether an acceptance or a rejection of a self’s identity
articulation by others (e.g., China rejecting Japan’s “normal nation” vision by evoking the war
memory and repentance among the Japanese and in the international community) could influence
the self’s identity formation. Further research could explore these dual faces—systemic and
historical—of the relational aspect of identity.
Lastly, I would like to conclude by noting the political significance of Japan’s ongoing
normalization, as this redefinition of national identity could determine the country’s international
standing for the decades to come. As the new Prime Minister Abe, at the time of writing, is again
promoting the issues of constitutional revision as one of his priorities for this year’s upcoming
Upper House election, a nationwide discussion on the definition of Japan’s “normalcy” is an
urgent matter. While I have attempted to account for this normalcy as a mosaic of two visions
held by the normalists and internationalists, it is ultimately in the hands of Japanese domestic
actors to decide what kind of a “normal” nation Japan will become. Therefore, it is my sincere
hope that my thesis inspires and contributes to further public discussions on the country’s new
role in the rapidly evolving international security environment.

113

References
Abdelal, Rawi et al. 2006. “Identity as a Variable.” Perspectives on Politics 4 (4): 695-711.
Abe, Shinzo. 2006. Ustukushii Kuni E [Toward a Beautiful Country]. Tokyo: Bungei Shunji.
Barnett, Michael. 1999. “Culture, Strategy, and Foreign Policy Change: Israel’s Road to Oslo.”
European Journal of International Relations 5 (1): 5-36.
Berger, Thomas, Mike Mochizuki, and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama ed. 2007. Japan in International
Politics: The Foreign Policies of an Adaptive State. Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers.
Berger, Thomas. 1996. “Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan,” In The
Culture of National Security: Norms and Identities in World Politics, edited by Peter
Kazenstein, 317-156 (New York: Columbia University Press.
————1998. Cultures of Antimilitarism. London: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Betts, Richard K. 1993. “Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the
Cold War.” International Security 18 (3): 34-77.
Boyd, J. Patrick and Richard J. Samuels. 2005. “Nine Lives?: The Politics of Constitutional
Reform in Japan.” Policy Studies 19.
Brubaker, Rogers and Fredrick Cooper. 2000. “Beyond ‘Identity.’” Theory and Society 29 (1):
1-47.
Bukh, Alexander. 2009. “Identity, Foreign Policy and the ‘Other’: Japan’s ‘Russia.’” European
Journal of International Relations 15 (2): 319-345.
Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. 2012. “Public Poll Regarding the Self-Defense Force and
Defense Issues,” January. http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h23/h23-bouei/index.html.
Chai, Sun-Ki. 1997. “Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine: Three Techniques for
Institutionalization.” International Organization 51 (3): 389-412.
Dower, John W. 1979. Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience,
1878-1954. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Dueck, Colin. 2006. Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand
Strategy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Eto, Jun. 1980. 1946-Nen Kempo: Sono Kosoku [The 1946 Constituion: Its Constraints]. Tokyo:
Bungeishunjusha.
————1986. Nichibei Senso wa Owatte inai: Shukkumei no Taiketsu—Sono Genzai, Kako,
Mirai [Japan-U.S. War Is Not Over: A Destined Duel—Its Present, Past, and Future].
114

Tokyo: Nesco Books.
Funabashi, Yoichi. 1991. “Japan and the New World Order.” Foreign Affairs 70 (5): 58-74.
————1994. “Introduction: Japan's International Agenda for the 1990s.” In Japan's
International Agenda edited by Funabashi Yoichi, 1-27. New York: New York
University Press.
Genron NPO. 2006. “Dai Ni Kai Nichu Kyodo Yoron Chosa ni tsuite” [The Second Japan-China
Joint
Public
Poll],
August
2,
Accessed
April
30,
2013.
http://www.genron-npo.net/world/genre/tokyobeijing/---.html.
————2012. “Dai Hachi Kai Nichu Kyodo Yoron Chosa ni tsuite” [The Eighth Japan-China
Joint
Public
Poll],
June
20,
Accessed
April
30,
2013.
http://www.genron-npo.net/world/genre/cat119/2012-a.html.
Gould, Stephen Jay. 2002. The Structure of Evolutionary Theory. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press.
Green, Michael J. 2001. Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of
Uncertain Power. New York: Palgrave.
Hagström, Linus. 2006. “Identity Politics and Japan’s Foreign Policy.” Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift
108 (2): 180-189.
Hashimoto, Akikazu, Mike M. Mochizuki, and Kurayoshi Takara ed. 2005. The Okinawan
Question and the U.S.-Japan Alliance. Washington, DC: Sigur Center for Asian
Studies.
Hatoyama, Yukio. 1998. “Dai 38 ki Hitotsubashi Foramu 21: Nikkan Kankei Kako kara Mirai”
[The 38th Hitotsubashi Forum 21: Korea-Japan Relations From Past to Present], May
26, Accessed April 30, 2013. http://www.hatoyama.gr.jp/speech/ot01.html.
Heginbotham, Eric and Richard J. Samuels. 1998. “Mercantile Realism and Japanese Security
Policy.” International Security 22 (4): 171-203.
Hirata, Keiko. 2008. “Who Shapes the National Security Debate? Divergent Interretations of
Japan’s Security Role,” Asian Affairs 35 (3): 123-151.
Hoffmann, Stanley. 1968. Gulliver’s Troubles; or, The Setting of American Foreign Policy. New
York: McGraw-Hill.
Honda, Masaru et al, eds. 2005. Jieitai: Shirarezaru Henyo [Self-Defense Forces: The Unknown
Changes]. Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha.
Hughes, Christopher W. 2004a. Japan's Re-Emergence as a "Normal" Military Power. Oxford:
Oxford University Press for the International Institute of Strategic Studies.
————2004b. Japan’s Security Agenda: Military, Economic, and Environmental Dimensions.
115

Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
————2009. Japan's Remilitarisation. Oxon, U.K.: Routledge for International Institute for
Strategic Studies.
————2012. “The Democratic Party of Japan's New (but Failing) Grand Security Strategy:
From ‘Reluctant Realism’ to ‘Resentful Realism’? ” The Journal of Japanese Studies
38 (1): 109-140.
INSS Special Report. 2000. “The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature
Partnership.” Institute for National Strategic Studies. Washington: National Defense
University.
Igarashi, Takeshi. 1985. “Peace-Making and Party Politics: The Formation of the Domestic
Foreign-Policy System in Postwar Japan.” Journal of Japanese Studies 11 (2):
323-365.
Iokibe, Makoto and Robert D. Eldridge. 2011. The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan.
London: Routledge.
Ishiba, Shigeru. 2005. Kokubo [National Defense]. Tokyo: Shinchosha.
Ishihara, Shintaro. 1991. The Japan That Can Say No. New York: Simon & Schster.
Ito, Go. 2007. “Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations,” In Japan in International
Politics: The Foreign Policies of an Adaptive State edited by Thomas Berger, Mike
Mochizuki, and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, 75-95. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Katzenstein, Peter J. and Nobuo Okawara. 1993. “Japan’s National Security: Structures, Norms,
and Policies.” International Security 17 (4): 84-118.
Kawasaki, Tsuyoshi. 2001. “Postclassical Realism and Japanese Security Policy.” The Pacific
Review 14 (2): 221-40.
Kazenstein, Peter J. 1996. Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar
Japan. New York: Cornell University Press.
Keohane, Robert O. 1986. “Theory of World Politics.” In Neorealism and Its Critics, edited by
Robert O. Keohane, 158-203, New York: Columbia University Press.
Kimura, Hiroshi. 2000. Distant Neighbours 1, Japanese-Russian Relations under Brezhnev and
Andropov. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.
Klingberg, Frank L. 1983. Cyclical Trends in American Foreign Policy Moods. Lanham, MD:
University Press of America.
Kosaka, Masataka. 1975. “Tsusho Kokka Nihon no Unmei” [The Destiny of the Mercantile
Nation Japan]. Chuo Koron (November).
116

Koslowski, Rey and Friedrich V. Kratochwil. 1994. “Understanding Change in International
Politics: the Soviet Empire’s Demise and the International System.” International
Organization. 48 (2): 215-247.
Ladd, Everett Carll and Karlyn H. Bowman. 1996. Public Opinion in America and Japan: How
We See Each Other and Ourselves. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute
Press.
Layne, Christopher. 1993. “The Unipolar Illusion.” International Security 17 (4): 5-51.
Lind, Jennifer M. 2004. “Pacifism or Passing the Buck?” International Security 29 (1): 92-121.
Maull, Hanns W. 1990. “Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers.” Foreign Affairs 69 (5):
91-106.
McCrisken, Trevor B. 2002. “Exceptionalism,” in Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, vol.
2, 2nd ed., edited by Alexander DeConde et al. New York: Scribner.
————2003. American Exceptionalism and the Legacy of Vietnam. New York: Macmillan.
McDougall, Walter A. 1997. Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the
World since 1776. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Menon, Rajan. 1997. “Japan: The Once and Future Superpower.” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists. 53 (1): 29-34.
Midford, Paul. 2006. “Japanese Public Opinion and the War on Terrorism: Implications for
Japan’s Security Strategy.” Policy Studies 27.
————2011. Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism to Realism?.
Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
Miyazawa, Kiichi. 1956. Tokyo-Washington no Mitsudan [Tokyo-Washington Confidential Talk].
Tokyo: Jitsugyo no Nihonsha.
Mizokami, Kyle. 2012 “New Japan Self Defense Force Initiatives on Amphibious Warfare,
Global Hawk, Cyber-Terrorism,” Japan Security Watch, Aug 28, Accessed April 30,
2013. http://jsw.newpacificinstitute.org/?p=10456.
Mochizuki, Mike. 2007. “Japan’s Changing International Role,” In Japan in International
Politics: The Foreign Policies of an Adaptive State, edited by Thomas Berger, Mike
Mochizuki, and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, 1-22, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Nuemann, Iver B. 1996. “Self and Other in International Relations.” European Journal of
International Relations 2 (2): 139-174.
————1998. Uses of the Other: “The East” in European Identity Formation. Minneapolis,
MN: University of Minnesota Press.
117

Office for the Prime Minister's Commission on Japan's Goals in the 21st Century, Cabinet
Secretariat. 1999. The Frontier Within: Individual Empowerment and Better
Governance in the New Millennium. Tokyo: Government of Japan.
Oka, Takashi. 1983. “Japan Takes Firm Stand with West on Defense Issues at Summit.” The
Christian
Science
Monitor,
June
1,
Accessed
April
30,
2013.
http://www.csmonitor.com/1983/0601/060153.html.
Okano-Heijmans, Maaike. 2012. “Japan’s Security Posture in Asia: Changing tactics or strategy?”
ISPI – Analysis (July).
Oros, Andrew L. 2008. Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security.
Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Ozawa, Ichiro. 1992a. “Hoshuseiji no Shissei o Tadasu” [Correcting the Attitude of Conservative
Politics], Voice (March).
————1992b. “Wareware wa Naze Kaikoku o Mezasu ka” [Why Do We Aim to Open Our
Country?], Bungei Shunju (December).
————1994. Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation. Translated by Louisa
Rubinfien. Tokyo: Kodansha International.
Perlez, Jane. 2013. “As Dispute Over Islands Escalates, Japan and China Send Fighter Jets to the
Scene.” The New York Times. January 18, Accessed April 30, 2013.
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/19/world/asia/china-japan-island-dispute-escalates-t
o-air.html?_r=0.
Pyle, Kenneth B. 1996. The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era. Washington,
D.C.: AEI Press.
————2007. Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose. New York: The
Century Foundation.
Ralph, Cossa and Brad Glasserman. 2005. “U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation: Has Japan Become
the Great Britain of Asia?” Pacific Forum CSIS Issues & Insights 5.
Reus-Smit, Christian. 2005. “Constructivism.” In Theories in International Relations Third
Edition, edited by Scott Burchill et al., 188-212. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Rose, Gideon. 1998. “Neoclasssical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy.” World Politics 51
(1): 144-172.
Rosecrance, Richard. 1986. The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the
Modern World. New York: Basic Books.
Ruggie, John. 1993. “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International
Relations.” International Organization. 47 (1): 139-174.
118

Rumelili, Bahar. 2004. “Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the
EU’s Mode of Differentiation,” Review of International Studies 30 (1): 27-47.
Samuels, Richard J. 2007. Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr. 1986. The Cycles of American History. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Schulze, Kai. 2010. “The Rise of China and Changes in Japan’s Identity Construction.” Paper
presented at the ISA Annual Convention, New Orleans, February 17-20.
Scott Burchill et al. ed. 2005. Theories in International Relations Third Edition. New York:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Serge, Richard. 1994. “The Exceptionalist Syndrome in U.S. Continental and Overseas
Expansion.” In Reflections on American Exceptionalism, edited by David K. Adams
and Cornelis A. van Minnen, 73-82, Staffordshire: Keele University Press.
Shimizu, Ikutaro. 1980. Nippon yo, Kokka tare: Kaku no Sentaku [Japan, Become a True State!:
The Nuclear Option]. Tokyo: Bungeishunjusha.
Shinoda, Tomohito. 2004. Kantei Gaiko Seiji Riidaashippu no Yukue [Cabinet Diplomacy:
Toward Political Leadership]. Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha.
Singh, Bhubhindar. 2008. “Japan’s Security Policy: From a Peace State to an International State.”
The Pacific Review 21(3): 303-325.
Smith, Anthony D. 1991. National Identity. London: Penguin Books.
Soeya, Yoshihide, Masayuki Tadokoro, and David A. Welch ed. 2011. Japan as a “Normal
Country”?: A Nation in Search for Its Place in the World. Toronto: University of
Toronto Press.
Soeya, Yoshihide. 2005. Nihon no “Midoru Pawaa” Gaiko: Sengo Nihon no Sentaku to Koso
[Japan’s “Middle Power” Diplomacy: Postwar Japan’s Choices and Conceptions].
Tokyo: Chikuma Shinsho.
————2011. “A ‘Normal’ Middle Power: Interpreting Changes in Japanese Security Poilicy in
the 1990s and After.” In Japan as a “Normal Country”?: A Nation in Search for Its
Place in the World edited by Yoshihide Soeya, Masayuki Tadokoro, and David A.
Welch, 72-97. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Spruyt, Hendrik. 1994. The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Stephanson, Anders. 1995. Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right. New
119

York: Hill & Wang.
Tadokoro, Masayuki. 2011. “Changes and Continuity in Japan’s ‘Abnormalcy’: An Emerging
External Attitude of the Japanese Public.” In Japan as a 'Normal Country'?: A Nation
in Search of Its Place in the World, edited by Yoshihide Soeya, Masayuki Tadokoro,
and David A. Welch, 38-71. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Tanaka, Hitoshi. 2005. “Higashi Ajia Kyodotai o Shiya ni Nichibei Domei o Katsuyo Shi,
Baransu aru Nodoteki Gaiko o” [Activating the Japan-U.S. Alliance in the Context of
an East Asian Community: Toward a Balanced and Lively Diplomacy], Nihon no
Ronten 2006 [Issues for Japan 2006], 82-85. Tokyo: Bungei Shunju.
Tucker, Robert W. and David C. Hendrickson. 1990. Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas
Jefferson. New York: Oxford University Press.
Tuveson, Ernest Lee. 1968. Redeemer Nation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Urrestarazu, Ursula S. 2011. “‘Identity’ in International Relations and Foreign Policy Theory.”
Paper presented at the ISA Annual Convention, Montreal, 16-19 March.
Waltz, Kenneth N. 1993. “The Emerging Structure of International Politics.” International
Security 18 (2): 44-79.
Watanabe, Tsuneo. 1996. “The Bankruptcy of Civil-Military Relations in Japan.” NIRA Review.
Weber, Cynthia. 2005. International Theory: A Critical Introduction Second Edition. New York:
Routledge.
Wendt, Alexander. 1992. “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power
Politics.” International Organization 46 (2): 391-425.
————1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Westlake, Adam. 2013. “Japan to Use Unmanned US Drones to Monitor Senkaku Islands.”
Japan
Daily
Press,
January
2,
Accessed
April
30,
2013.
http://japandailypress.com/japan-to-use-unmanned-us-drones-to-monitor-senkaku-isla
nds-0220703.

120

